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4. Conclusions:	 strong	 EU	 policy	 encouragement	 —	 but	 behind	 a	 ‘cordon	
sanitaire’	
	




2. Risk	 management	 during	 the	 arbitration:	 ‘substantive	 jurisdiction’	 and	
procedure	challenges	
2.1. Finding	the	proper	law	in	multiparty	cases	
2.1.1. the	 ‘defined	 legal	 relationship’	 and	 its	 connection	 to	 the	
dispute	in	arbitration	
2.1.2. collective	contractual	competition	claims	—	the	relevant	law	





2.2.3. superiority	 of	 collective	 arbitration	 over	 other	 available	
dispute	resolution	procedures	
2.3. Approving	the	representative	





































































































Nearly	 15	 years	 later,	 the	 picture	 has	 changed	 significantly.	 Court	 claims	 by	
businesses	 requiring	 compensation	 for	 harm	 caused	 by	 competition	 law	
infringements	 established	 by	 the	 EU	 Commission	 and	 by	 national	 competition	
authorities	 have	 increased	 substantially,	 both	 in	 number	 and	 by	 size	 of	
recoveries.2		The	EU	institutions	have	—	for	the	most	part	—	strongly	encouraged	
compensation	 claims	 against	 competition	 law	 infringers,	sometimes	 called	
‘private	enforcement’	of	competition	law.	
	
In	 parallel	 with	 this	 trend,	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	 and	 national	 competition	 authorities	 has	 increased	 sharply	 in	
intensity	since	2000.3		Competition	 law	 infringements	—	particularly	cartels	—
are	 increasingly	 international	 in	 scope	 and	 effect,	 and	 co-operation	 between	
competition	authorities	has	increased	to	keep	pace	with	this.		
	
By	 comparison	 with	 the	 developed	 international	 co-ordination	 of	 public	
competition	enforcement,	the	mechanisms	available	to	private	parties	to	manage	











ensure	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 civil	 judgments	 —	 defendants	 in	
competition	cases	still	routinely	face	multiple	claims	in	different	courts.		Claimants	












Recommendation	 prompting	 Member	 States	 to	 ensure	 effective	 national	
procedures	 for	 ‘collective	 redress’	 actions	 by	 groups	 of	 claimants	 against	
infringers	of	all	directly	effective	EU	law	—	among	the	most	important	being	the	


















competition	 law	 infringements. 7 		 The	 flexibility	 of	 arbitration	 in	 resolving	
disputes	 and	 the	 broad	 enforceability	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 should	 make	
arbitrated	solutions	to	competition	redress	issues	particularly	attractive.	
	
This	 thesis	 therefore	 considers	 two	 closely	 related	 questions.	 	 First,	 can	
arbitration	of	EU	competition	claims	proceed	on	a	collective	basis	—	to	cover	all	









admissible	 and	 the	 resulting	 award	 recognised	 and	 enforced	 across	 the	 EU?		
Second	—	and	assuming	that	the	answer	to	the	first	question	is	‘yes’	in	whole	or	



















issue	—	of	clear	benefit	 to	both	sets	of	parties	—	would	be	 to	gather	all	of	 the	
claims	against	a	single	competition	infringement	in	a	single	collective	procedure	
whose	outcome	is	enforceable	across	the	EU.		This	is,	of	course,	already	possible	
in	 the	 US	 using	 the	 ‘class	 action’	 device.8		 Other	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	—	
Australia,	some	Canadian	provinces	—	have	similar	litigation	procedures.		Some	
EU	Member	States	have	recently	developed	 their	own	 ‘collective	redress’	 court	
procedures	 —	 including	 the	 UK,	 which	 has	 chosen	 to	 model	 itself	 largely	 on	
Canadian	precedent.	
	








before	 a	 dispute	 arises	 or	 (in	 a	 ‘submission’	 agreement)	 afterwards.	 	 The	
arbitrator	is	given	the	power	by	the	parties	to	resolve	a	given	civil	dispute	(or	set	



















the	 arbitrator’s	 jurisdiction)	 and	does	not	 offend	against	 the	most	basic	public	






collective	 redress	 procedures	 will	 probably	 begin	 through	 (post-dispute)	
agreements	to	submit	 to	arbitration.	 	Defendants	 faced	with	actual	or	potential	
resource	intensive	collective	court	actions	in	a	number	of	jurisdictions	in	the	EU	
—	or	more	widely	—	may	find	it	more	effective	(and	less	costly)	to	agree	to	resolve	
all	 the	 class	 claims	 made	 against	 them	 in	 a	 single	 arbitrated	 international	
collective	proceeding.	
	
Collective	 arbitration	using	 existing	pre-dispute	 contractual	 arbitration	 clauses	
may	 also	 be	 possible.	 	Most	 standard	 arbitration	 clauses	 recommended	by	 the	
larger	arbitration	institutions	give	a	wide	procedural	discretion	to	the	arbitrator.		
The	arbitration	institutions	themselves	also	sometimes	have	power	to	intervene	
to	 shape	 the	 arbitration	 procedure	 if	 the	 parties	 cannot	 agree. 13 		 Collective	
arbitration	under	pre-dispute	arbitration	clauses	has	already	 taken	place	 in	an	

























Descriptors	 (and	 thus	 taxonomy)	 appear	 unusually	 important	 in	 the	 field	 of	
collective	redress	 in	Europe.	 	There	 is	strong	disapproval	 in	Europe	of	US	class	
actions	—	 the	most	 high-profile	 type	 of	 collective	 redress	 in	 the	world.15		 The	
perceived	 negative	 effects	 of	 such	 action	 —	 including	 ‘blackmail’	 suits	 and	
excessive	lawyers’	contingency	fees	based	on	a	percentage	of	trebled	damages	—	








the	 various	 forms	 of	 collective	 redress	 and	 the	 procedural	mechanisms	which	
underpin	them.	Not	all	collective	redress	is	a	‘class	action’.	
	
‘Collective	 redress’	 is	 a	 term	adopted	by	EU	 legislators	 in	 the	2013	package	 to	
describe	an	action	(either	for	damages	or	for	an	injunction)	brought	in	two	ways.		
The	 action	 can	 be	 brought	 (by	 two	 or	more	 harmed	 claimants)	 collectively	—	
effectively	as	part	of	a	‘bundled’	or	group	proceeding.		Or	the	action	can	be	brought	
by	an	 ‘entity’	 representing	 the	group	of	 (two	or	more)	persons	who	have	been	
harmed.17	
	




























profit	 organization	 —	 and	 they	 may	 also	 need	 to	 be	 authorized	 by	 national	






group	 (‘opt-in’).	 	A	minority	of	 countries	 allow	representative	 collective	 claims	
where	—	after	suitable	notification	(advertising)	—	all	claimants	within	the	group	
description	 (set	 by	 a	 court)	 will	 be	 bound	 to	 the	 collective	 claim	 unless	 they	
individually	decide	not	to	participate	(‘opt-out’).21	
	






for	 reaching	 a	 resolution	 of	 the	 collective	 claim.	 	 The	 procedure	 adopted	may	
include	some	or	all	of	 the	elements	of	an	 ‘opt-out’	representative	action	and	so	






without	 the	 use	 of	 an	 intermediary	 representative.	 	 All	 group	 actions	 are	























In	 any	 case,	 simple	 joinder	—	 or	 consolidation	—	 of	 arbitrated	 claims	 is	 not	
straightforward	and	does	not	conform	to	the	pattern	seen	in	litigation.		A	number	
of	countries’	arbitration	laws	do	not	permit	the	consolidation	of	several	ongoing	





Consent	 can,	 however,	 be	 given	 indirectly	 through	 choice	 of	 the	 rules	 of	 an	
arbitration	 institution	 permitting	 consolidation.	 	 Those	 institution	 rules	which	
permit	consolidation	often	have	 fairly	detailed	requirements.	 	For	example,	 the	
International	Chamber	of	Commerce	arbitration	rules	only	permit	the	ICC	Court	
to	consolidate	arbitrations	(without	unanimous	consent)	where	the	claims	are	all	




We	 consider	 further	 in	our	 recommendations	 at	 the	 end	of	 this	 thesis	how	 far	
arbitration	 institutions	may	wish	 to	 adapt	 their	 practice	 or	 even	 their	 rules	 to	
make	 group	 arbitration	more	 available.	 	 Some	 (such	 as	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 Swiss	
Chambers)	are	already	sufficiently	permissive	to	allow	fairly	advanced	forms	of	
group	action	to	be	used	in	competition	arbitrations.	27			The	2013	EU	competition	
and	 collective	 redress	 package	may	 also	 prompt	 other	 institutions	 to	 consider	
adopting	similarly	broad	provisions.	
	










which	 adopt	 collective	 redress	 procedures	which	 cross	 the	 opt-in	 and	 opt-out	
divide.	 	Either	 these	are	 ‘tailored’	systems	 for	particular	situations	—	the	main	





































Even	 in	 the	 USA	 class	 actions	 remain	 controversial.33		 The	 arbitration	 of	 class	
claims,	which	evolved	from	the	early	2000s	—	notably	in	the	Green	Tree	case34	—	
although	permitted	by	the	US	Supreme	Court,	has	been	closely	examined	by	that	
court	 on	 a	 number	 of	 later	 occasions.	 	 We	 consider	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	
jurisprudence	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 but	 it	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	 degree	 of	






arbitrations	 having	 their	 seat	 in	 the	 EU.	 	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	where	 (as	 is	
usual)	 the	 competition	 claim	 is	 non-contractual	 in	 nature	 and	 EU	 legislation	
imposes	a	law	governing	important	elements	of	a	collective	procedure.35		
	
















































We	 suggest	 that	 this	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 the	 best	 starting	 point	 for	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 feasibility	 of	 collective	 competition	 arbitration	 in	 the	 EU.		
Rather,	 we	 believe	 that	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 twin	 ideas	 of	 arbitrability	 and	
consent	to	arbitration,	taken	in	the	context	of	overriding	EU	law	principles,	should	
give	a	clearer	answer	to	the	principal	thesis	question	—	can	collective	arbitration	








The	 European	 literature	 has	 historically	 (broadly)	 focused	 on	 three	 issues	 of	




















In	 addition	 to	 considering	 commercial	 arbitration,	 there	 are	 also	 lessons	 to	 be	
learned	from	some	forms	of	 international	public	 law	arbitration	—	particularly	
investment	 treaty	arbitration.	 	We	will,	 in	particular,	 consider	 in	Chapter	2	 the	
admissibility	award	of	the	international	ICSID	arbitrators	in	the	Abaclat	dispute	
—	 between	 Argentina	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	 Italian	 holders	 of	 Argentine	




collective	 arbitration	 of	 EU	 competition	 claims.	 	 The	 literature	 on	 the	 specific	
issues	raised	by	competition	arbitrations	has	focused	on	the	question	of	whether	
competition	claims	can	be	arbitrated	(bi-laterally)	at	all—	a	question	which	now	





As	 EU	 competition	 law	 is	 fully	 directly	 applicable	 in	 relations	 between	private	
parties	—	and	its	observance	is	a	matter	of	EU	public	policy	—	EU	law	principles	

















EU	 law	 influence	 —	 may	 differ	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 allows	 court	
intervention	in	arbitration.	 	Second,	national	litigation	procedures	for	collective	
redress	in	the	EU	—	whether	in	the	competition	field	or	otherwise	—	may	provide	
a	 suitable	 and	acceptable	 template	 for	 an	 arbitrator	 to	 craft	 his	 own	 collective	
procedure.	 	 Finally,	 and	 importantly	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 collective	 arbitration	
proposed	here,	the	increasing	availability	of	‘collective	settlement’	regimes	in	EU	
Member	 States	 may	 allow	 a	 novel	 ‘hybrid’	 solution	 to	 resolving	 a	 collective	
dispute.	 This	 could	 combine	 collective	 arbitration	 and	 national	 (court	 based)	
collective	settlement	mechanisms	to	offer	an	effective	and	final	resolution	of	the	
claim	covering	all	members	of	the	class	in	the	‘settling’	countries	and	extending	
across	 a	 number	 of	 EU	 Member	 States.	 	 	 Consideration	 of	 the	 legislative	


















the	 best	 form	 of	 collective	 procedure	 to	 use	 if	 they	 are	 asked	 to	 decide	 a	
competition	claim	presented	as	a	collective	action.			
	
Finally,	 arbitration	 institutions	 and	 government	 policy	 makers	 should	 also	 be	
interested	in	the	conclusions	reached	here.			Arbitration	institutions	have	already	
taken	 an	 interest	 in	 collective	 redress	 in	 Europe.	 	 The	 German	 arbitration	










with	 collective	 arbitration	 would	 be	 premature.	42		 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 this	 thesis	





This	 thesis	will	 be	 presented	 in	 five	 further	Chapters	 followed	by	 a	 chapter	 of	
recommendations	and	conclusions.			
	





























choice	 of	 the	 most	 appropriate	 seat	 for	 the	 arbitration.	 	 So,	 in	 chapter	 5,	 we	











settlement	 regimes	 (in	 the	UK	and	Netherlands)	which	allow	 the	 settlement	of	
collective	claims	without	the	need	for	litigation.	We	examine	if	court	settlement	
orders	can	affect	group	members	who	may	be	outside	the	(jurisdictional)	limits	of	
the	 competition	 arbitration	 proceedings	—	 those	 who	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 have	




Finally	 (in	 chapter	 7),	 we	 conclude	 that	 competition	 claims	 can	 indeed	 be	
collectively	arbitrated	with	wide	enforceability	within	the	EU,	provided	that	some	
care	is	taken	in	the	crafting	of	the	appropriate	collective	arbitration	procedure.		








Chapter	2	 Can	 collective	 competition	 claims	 be	 arbitrated	 in	 the	
EU?	





	 	 2.1	 arbitrability	and	the	New	York	Convention	
	 2.2	 arbitrability	of	competition	disputes	
	 2.3	 ability	to	arbitrate	collective	claims	




















	 	 4.2.1	 arbitrator’s	freedom	to	‘certify	a	class’	




























the	 type	 of	 finding	 against	 which	 the	 challenge	 is	 made.	 	 In	 particular,	 is	 the	
challenge	 against	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 arbitrator’s	 jurisdiction	 to	 resolve	 the	
competition	dispute	or	against	the	admissibility	of	the	(collective)	procedure	he	
has	 determined	 should	 apply	 to	 the	 arbitration?	 	 This	 interplay	 between	 the	
timing	of	the	challenge	and	the	nature	of	the	decision	being	questioned	will	in	turn	
condition:	
• the	 set	 of	 legal	 rules	 under	 which	 both	 the	 criteria	 for	 assessing	
‘arbitrability’	 and	 the	 methods	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	 arbitration	
















issue	 of	 consent	 to	 arbitrate	—	 both	 as	 to	 the	 substantive	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	

















There	 is	 no	 international	 law	 definition	 of	 the	 term	 ‘arbitration’	 or	 ‘arbitral	
award’.2		This	malleability	of	terminology	has	necessarily	spilled	over	to	the	use	
of	 the	 term	 ‘arbitrability’,	which	 has	 traditionally	 been	 seen	 as	 addressing	 the	
issue	of	whether	the	type	of	dispute	presented	for	arbitration	is	of	a	nature	to	be	
arbitrated. 3 	For	 example,	 many	 legal	 systems	 exclude	 family	 or	 inheritance	
disputes	from	arbitration	on	the	public	policy	grounds	of	their	‘non-commercial’	





can	be	referred	 to	arbitration	(that	 is,	are	 ‘arbitrable’).6		 In	contrast,	where	 the	
resolution	of	a	dispute	necessarily	involves	the	intervention	of	a	public	authority	
exercising	its	public	law	powers,	that	dispute	will	not	be	arbitrable.		An	arbitrator	





indicate	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 particular	 dispute	 should	 be	 referred	 to	 arbitration	




required	as	well	as	consideration	of	 its	 ‘subject	matter’).	The	discussion	 in	 this	
chapter	 will	 treat	 ‘arbitrability’	 in	 the	 narrower	 sense:	 the	 wider	 issue	 is,	 we	

























of	 the	 international	 ordre	 public	 arbitrability	 exception	 to	 arbitration	 of	 EU	
competition	 disputes.	 	 But	 it	 is	 the	New	 York	 Convention9	which	 provides	 the	











the	 proceedings	 (for	 example	 on	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	 jurisdiction)	 is	
limited	to	addressing	the	following	questions:		
• is	there	in	fact	an	arbitration	agreement	between	the	parties?	
• does	 the	 dispute	 concern	 a	 subject	 matter	 capable	 of	 settlement	 by	
arbitration	(arbitrablity)?	and	
• is	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 void,	 inoperative	 or	 incapable	 of	 being	
performed?10			
	
Article	 V	 of	 the	 Convention	—	which	 applies	 at	 the	 time	 of	 enforcement	 of	 an	




































manner	 envisaged	 by	 the	 parties?14		 The	 second	 stems	 from	 the	 potential	 for	
collision	between	the	parties’	agreement	to	arbitrate	collectively	and	ordre	public	
—	sometimes	framed	in	this	context	as	a	consequence	of	 fundamental	rules	on	











matter	 of	 EU	 public	 policy	—	to	 give	 pre-dispute	 consent	 to	 any	 arbitration.17		





In	 general,	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 in	 accepted	 international	 arbitration	
practice	is	‘yes’.	Ever	since	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	held,	in	Mitsubishi	v	
Soler18	in	1985,	that	an	anti-trust	dispute	could	be	referred	to	arbitration	despite	
the	 public	 interest	 in	 anti-trust	 enforcement,	 courts	 in	 other	 States	 have	 also	























There	 is,	however,	no	express	confirmation	of	 this	 in	EU	 jurisprudence.	 	 In	 the	
leading	 EcoSwiss	 case	 the	 CJEU	 only	 confirmed	 that	 EU	 competition	 law	
enforcement	is	a	matter	of	EU	public	policy.21	Member	State	courts	are	entitled	to	









Implicitly,	 therefore,	 arbitrators	must	 be	 free	—	 and	 (at	 least	 in	 practice)	 are	
probably	obliged	—	to	apply	EU	competition	law	in	disputes	where	a	restriction	
on	 trade	 between	 Member	 States	 may	 be	 relevant	 to	 the	 decision	 they	 are	
requested	 to	make.23	That	 is,	 (by	 implication)	 EU	 law	 recognizes	 that	 national	
arbitration	 law	 may	 treat	 competition	 disputes	 as	 arbitrable.	 	 But	—	 by	 only	
requiring	a	‘second	look’	after	an	award	has	been	made	—	the	CJEU	has	(perhaps	
inadvertently)	 permitted	 each	 national	 court	 to	 apply	 its	 own	 arbitration	
framework	for	ordre	public	to	the	enforcement	of	competition	awards.24		
	
Clearly,	 the	ordre	public	procedural	 tests	 for	 refusal	 to	 recognize	or	enforce	an	
award	may	differ	somewhat	between	Member	States,	even	within	the	EU.25		But	
fundamental	EU	principles	will	need	to	be	applied	alongside	domestic	policy	by	
civil	 courts	 in	 the	 EU	when	 either	 supervising	 or	 enforcing	 arbitrations	 of	 EU	
competition	disputes.26		National	courts	in	the	EU	will	need	to	consider	the	general	
principles	 of	 EU	 law	 —	 in	 particular,	 those	 set	 out	 in	 the	 EU	 Charter	 of	
Fundamental	 Rights	 and	 by	 the	 CJEU	 in	 its	 decisional	 practice. 27 		 In	 case	 of	






























is	 required	 by	 the	majority	 of	 national	 arbitration	 laws.29	The	main	 review	 of	





















say	 that	 there	 is	a	 firm	consensus	at	 international	 level	on	 this	 issue	—	a	 fluid	







the	 exceptions,	 set	 out	 in	 Article	 II,	which	 can	 be	 applied	 by	 contracting	 State	




















The	 ordre	 public	 applied	 in	 the	 lex	 arbitri	 must	 however	 be	 respected	—	 the	
















































agreement	—	 although	 that	 choice	 of	 law	may	 not	 apply	 to	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	
arbitration	procedure	in	non-contractual	competition	law	claims.42		Nevertheless,	
for	 such	 post-dispute	 submission	 agreements	 (for	 example,	 between	 a	







objection	 being	 validly	 taken	 to	 a	 wide	 interpretation	 of	 the	 arbitrator’s	
jurisdiction.45	
	
The	 distinction	 between	 a	 challenge	 that	 the	 collective	 action	 is	 outside	 the	
arbitrator’s	substantive	jurisdiction	(because	there	is	a	failure	of	consent),	and	a	




not	 previously	 agreed	 by	 the	 parties	 and	 an	 award	 (including	 an	 admissibility	
award)	 can	 only	 be	 set	 aside	 if	 it	 amounts	 to	 a	 serious	 irregularity	 causing	






—	although	preferring	 an	 ‘opt-in’	 principle	 for	 collective	 redress	—	specifically	
provides	that	other	forms	of	collective	procedure	may	be	permissible	if	required	
in	the	interests	of	justice.49	Against	this	background,	we	do	not	believe	that	a	court	
in	 the	 EU	 could	 refuse	 recognition	 of	 a	 collective	 competition	 award	 under	 its	
national	arbitration	legislation	—	in	the	UK,	on	a	set	aside	application	for	‘serious	



























court	 (outside	 the	seat)	 to	apply	 its	own	ordre	public	 rules	and	not	necessarily	
those	of	the	seat	or	the	arbitration	agreement.52		These	rules	are	—	evidently	—	
not	 fully	 harmonised	 across	 the	 EU	 nor	 more	 widely,	 although	 again	 EU	 law	
general	principles	will	need	to	be	considered	by	courts	in	the	EU	when	enforcing	




‘collective’	 procedure.	Although	national	 enforcing	 courts	 are	 still	 permitted	 to	









As	well	 as	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 the	 dispute	 is	 of	 a	 type	
‘capable	 of	 settlement	 by	 arbitration’	 (arbitrability),	 the	New	York	 Convention	
also	allows	—	in	Article	II	(3)	—	a	court	to	refuse	a	reference	to	arbitrate	where:			




































under	 the	 second	of	 these	applicable	 laws	—	 the	proper	 law	of	 the	arbitration	






































In	either	case	—	and	 in	addition	to	 the	consideration	of	ordre	public	under	 the	
arbitrability	exception	—	the	(usually	broader)	public	policy	stance	taken	under	

























































































































If	a	 judge	 in	 the	 (collective	redress	 ‘friendly’)	 seat	of	arbitration	 is	 called	on	 to	




not	 conclusively	 dealt	with	 either	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 or	 by	 EU	 law:	
national	arbitration	rules	apply.	
	
In	 general,	 the	 courts	 in	 England	will	wait	 for	 the	 arbitrator	 to	 hand	 down	 an	
award,	including	a	decision	on	the	question	of	his	jurisdiction	(and	so	whether	the	
arbitration	agreement	is	interpreted	to	include	consent	to	collective	proceedings),	
before	 they	 intervene.71		 Since	 the	agreement	 to	arbitrate	 is	 separate	 from	any	
substantive	 contract,	 it	 is	 only	where	 a	 challenge	which	 specifically	 affects	 the	
















Both	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 and	 EU	 law	 principles	 could	 nevertheless	
indirectly	 apply	 to	 condition	 the	 court’s	 reasoning.	 	 The	New	York	Convention	
does	not,	however,	stipulate	the	type	of	review	required	for	this	purpose.74		The	
application	 of	 EU	 public	 policy	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 law	 of	 the	
arbitration	 agreement	 can	 permissibly	 (impliedly)	 extend	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
agreement	 to	EU	 competition	 claims	 is	 uncertain	 at	 present	—	as	 the	differing	
approaches	of	the	German	and	Dutch	courts	show.75		But	 it	 is	at	 least	clear	that	




Where	 a	 foreign	 court	 is	 later	 called	 on	 to	 enforce	 an	 international	 arbitration	
award,	 the	 enforcing	 court	 is	 also	 permitted	 to	 examine	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
agreement	to	arbitrate.			The	New	York	Convention	allows	the	enforcing	court	to	
consider	 both	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 agreement	 as	 a	 whole,	 but	 also	 its	 scope	—	
whether	the	award	is	partly	outside	the	terms	of	the	agreement	to	arbitrate	even	
if	 it	 is	 valid. 76 		 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 review	 of	 the	 agreement	 pre-award,	 the	
Convention	expressly	stipulates	that	the	applicable	law	for	determining	validity	at	
enforcement	of	the	award	is	the	law	expressly	chosen	by	the	parties	to	govern	the	
agreement	 or,	 if	 none,	 the	 law	 ‘of	 the	 place	 where	 the	 award	 was	 made’	 —	
generally	 accepted	 as	 being	 the	 lex	 arbitri.	 77 		 There	 is	 clearly	 a	 very	 close	
relationship	 between	 the	 analysis	 needed	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 arbitration	















enforcing	 court	 is	 also	 entitled	 to	 consider	 separately	 whether	 enforcing	 the	
award	would	be	contrary	to	ordre	public.80		It	was	this	provision	which	the	CJEU	




















with	 EU	 public	 policy	 to	 the	 extent	 indicated	 by	 the	 CJEU,	 if	 enforcement	 is	
requested	in	the	EU.			
	
We	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 conclusions	 for	 designing	 collective	
arbitration	proceedings	more	fully	in	chapter	4	—	particularly	for	non-contractual	
competition	claims	using	a	post-dispute	submission	agreement.		We	believe	that	
express	 choice	of	 an	applicable	 law,	embracing	a	developed	 ‘collective	 redress’	
procedural	mechanism,	to	govern	the	arbitration	agreement	should	be	capable	of	


















by	 the	 parties’	 agreement	 (the	Kompetenz-Kompetenz	 principle).84		We	 believe	















This	 Kompetenz-Kompetenz	 principle	 is	 a	 generally	 accepted	 principle	 in	






We	 again	 distinguish	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 arbitrator’s	 ‘substantive	
jurisdiction’	—	that	is,	the	scope	of	the	matters	referred	to	arbitration	—	and	that	
of	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 procedure	 which	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	
arbitration	 has	 proposed. 89 	When	 accepting	 or	 crafting	 any	 procedure,	 the	
arbitrator	must,	of	course,	always	act	within	the	express	or	implied	consent	of	the	





A	 leading	 example	 of	 the	 use	 by	 an	 international	 arbitral	 tribunal	 of	 the	





































In	Abaclat,	 the	 tribunal	 addressed,	 in	 an	 interim	 award,	 a	 situation	where	 the	
defendant	 (Argentina)	objected	 to	 the	 arbitration	 tribunal’s	 use	of	 a	purposive	
interpretation	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 to	 imply	 all	 parties’	 consent	 to	
collective	proceedings.95		Where	a	represented	claimant	seeks	to	object	to	the	use	












at	 the	 request	 of	 the	 representative	 (agent)	 of	 multiple	 claimants,	 the	 large	
majority	of	whom	were	not	participating	directly	in	the	arbitration.96	
	
The	 arbitration	 was	 conducted	 under	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 a	 bi-lateral	
investment	treaty	(BIT)	between	Argentina	and	Italy.	The	BIT	provided	that,	in	the	
event	of	dispute	between	Argentina	(the	issuer	of	the	securities	which	were	the	
subject	of	 the	 subsequent	dispute)	 and	any	 Italian	 securities	holder,	 the	 issues	
would	 be	 resolved	 by	 arbitration	 by	 three	 arbitrators	 appointed	 by	 ICSID	 and	
following	 the	 ICSID	 arbitration	 rules. 97 		 There	 was	 no	 choice	 of	 national	





time	of	 the	 tribunal’s	admissibility	decision,	 the	TFA	acted	on	behalf	of	around	
60,000	investors.		The	tribunal	(which	could	not	decide	unanimously),	found	that	























such	 a	 procedure	 in	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 the	 BIT.	 	 The	 ICSID	 statutes	 and	














On	the	question	of	whether	 it	had	 jurisdiction,	 the	tribunal	 first	considered	the	
issue	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 whether	 it	 would	 have	 jurisdiction	 if	 only	 one	 of	 the	









classification	 of	 its	 own	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 address	 the	 issue. 102 		 It	 first	 described	
‘representative’	proceedings	as	those	allowing	a	high	number	of	claims	to	be	dealt	
with	as	a	 single	action	by	 the	 representative.	The	 second	category	used	by	 the	




















to	 consent,	 especially	 for	 those	 who	 subscribe	 to	 a	 view	 of	 arbitration	 that	
requires	the	parties’	explicit	consent	not	only	to	arbitration	of	the	dispute	but	also	
to	the	procedure	to	be	used	in	the	arbitration.		In	contrast	aggregate	proceedings	




These	 Abaclat	 proceedings	 were,	 said	 the	 tribunal,	 commenced	 as	 ‘aggregate’	
proceedings	“in	which	each	individual	Claimant	was	aware	of	and	consented	to	the	
ICSID	arbitration”.	This	was	not	the	equivalent	of	a	US	class	action	commenced	by	




[…]	 the	 present	 proceedings	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 sort	 of	 hybrid	 kind	 of	 collective	
proceedings,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 starts	 as	 aggregate	 proceedings	 but	 then	
continues	with	 features	 similar	 to	 representative	 proceedings	 due	 to	 the	 high	
number	of	Claimants	involved.	106		
	




[…]	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 conceive	why	 and	 how	 the	 Tribunal	 could	 loose	 [sic]	 that	
jurisdiction	where	the	number	of	claimants	exceeds	a	certain	threshold.	[…]	what	









[BIT]	 and	 the	 spirit	 of	 ICSID	 to	 require,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 consent	 to	 ICSID	
arbitration	 in	 general,	 a	 supplementary	 express	 consent	 to	 the	 form	 of	 such	
















Finding	 that	 it	 had	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 claims,	 the	Abaclat	 tribunal	 turned	 to	
examine	the	admissibility	of	the	TFA	proposed	collective	procedure.		The	tribunal	
noted	 that	 the	 admissibility	 question	 is	 not	 whether	 Argentina	 had	 expressly	
consented	 to	a	 ‘mass	proceeding’	but	whether	 that	proceeding	was	 compatible	





First,	 was	 the	 silence	 of	 the	 ICSID	 procedural	 rules	 on	 the	 question	 of	 the	
admissibility	 of	 ‘mass	 proceedings’	 a	 ‘qualified	 silence’	 (as	 contended	 by	
Argentina)	 which	 required	 the	 additional	 consent	 of	 Argentina	 to	 the	 type	 of	









absence	 of	 express	 wording	 in	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 (or	 subsequent	











on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	was	 not	 open	 to	 an	 arbitrator	—	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 court	
forming	 part	 of	 a	 national	 legal	 order	—	 to	 rework	 the	 rules	 under	 which	 it	













ICSID	rules.	 	 	Arbitrators	do	not	—	he	contended	—	enjoy	an	 implied	 ‘original’	
jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law	 to	 fill	 gaps	 —	 whether	 substantive	 or	 of	
fundamental	procedure	—	in	the	way	that	courts	do	in	the	national	legal	order.117			
	
His	 analysis	 echoes	 that	 of	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 the	 Stolt-Nielsen	 case	—	





















On	 appropriateness	 of	 group	 treatment,	 were	 all	 the	 claims	 sufficiently	
homogenous	to	be	treated	together?		The	Tribunal	noted	that	the	dispute	between	
all	 of	 the	 claimants	 and	 Argentina	 related	 to	 Argentina’s	 similar	 behaviour	
towards	all	of	 its	 investors.	 	And	the	question	whether	the	individual	claimants	
had	additional,	separate	and	differentiated,	breach	of	contract	claims	(for	example	
against	the	intermediary	retail	banks	who	sold	them	the	securities)	was	outside	





in	 detail	 in	 any	 event.	 	 Finally,	 the	 restrictions	 on	 the	 individual	 claimants’	
procedural	rights	had	been	expressly	accepted	by	them	when	they	adhered	to	the	
















The	 tribunal	 itself	 addressed	 this	 ‘precedential’	 question	 in	 the	 admissiblity	
award.	125 		 In	 common	 with	 other	 types	 of	 arbitration	 awards,	 ICSID	 tribunal	
awards	 do	 not	 create	 ‘legally	 binding	 precedents’.126	In	 particular	 the	 tribunal	













[…]	 subject	 to	 the	 specific	 provisions	 of	 a	 treaty	 in	 question	 and	 of	 the	
circumstances	of	the	actual	case,	[the	Tribunal]	should	pay	due	consideration	to	












facts	 of	 the	 particular	 claim	 (and	 the	 need	 to	 allow	 a	 process	 giving	 effective	
redress	 to	 the	60,000	claimants).	But,	again,	 the	use	of	 the	general	principle	of	
effectiveness,	and	the	balancing	of	 the	conflicting	 interests	of	 the	parties	 in	 the	


















Consequently,	 we	 believe	 that	 an	 international	 arbitration	 tribunal	 is	 entitled,	
when	 considering	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 parties’	 consent	 to	 arbitrate,	 to	 distinguish	
between	consent	to	its	substantive	jurisdiction	and	the	(often	implied)	consent	to	










The	 conclusions	 above	 are	 based	 on	 a	 challenge	 to	 collective	 competition	
arbitration	by	the	defendants	in	the	proceedings	(Argentina).		How	(and	how	far)	
do	 they	 apply	where	 a	member	 of	 the	 claimant	 group	wishes	 to	 challenge	 the	
procedure	adopted?	
	
A	 claimant	 group	 member	 may	 seek	 to	 challenge	 the	 collective	 arbitration	
proceedings	 at	 the	 outset	 (in	 the	 supervising	 court	 of	 the	 seat).	 However,	 we	

































core	of	 the	mass	 claim.	 	Moreover,	 the	 claims	 in	 (group)	 arbitration	 should	be	
made	under	substantially	the	same	arbitration	agreement	—	at	least	governed	by	
the	same	proper	law	and	have	compatible	procedures	concerning	the	composition	















—	 is	 silent	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘compulsory’	 consolidation	 of	 separate	 but	 similar	
arbitration	 proceedings. 137 		 English	 law	 allows	 consolidation	 (or	 concurrent	
hearing)	only	if	all	of	the	parties	have	agreed	to	this.138		However,	the	rules	of	some	
arbitration	institutions	—	commonly	incorporated	into	arbitration	agreements	by	
reference	 —	 may	 nevertheless	 have	 provisions	 which	 ‘facilitate’	 appropriate	
consolidation.	 	 In	particular,	 the	 ICC	Rules	permit	 the	 ICC	Court,	 at	 any	party’s	
request,	to	consolidate	two	or	more	pending	ICC	arbitrations	if	they	have	sufficient	












In	 contrast	 to	 ‘grouped’	 forms	 of	 collective	 competition	 arbitration	 —	 which	
marshal	 (through	consolidation,	assignment	or	otherwise)	existing	arbitrations	









encompass	 claims	 not	 yet	 commenced	 in	 arbitration	 by	 the	 affected	 claimants	
themselves.		The	consent	of	the	represented	class	members	to	the	jurisdiction	of	
the	arbitrator	must	in	these	cases	necessarily	be	indirect.		And	if	the	arbitration	
agreement	 does	 not	 expressly	 contemplate	 collective	 proceedings,	 consent	 to	
them	will	need	to	be	implied141.	
	




however,	 a	 litigated	 collective	 competition	 claim). 142 	Indirect	 consent	 may,	
though,	also	be	given	impliedly,	as	where	a	person	belongs	to	an	organization	—	
















An	 arbitrator	 or	 supervising	 court,	 when	 considering	 the	 scope	 of	 consent	 to	
arbitrate,	 will	 need	 to	 examine	 both	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 (between	 the	































have	 wider	 rights	 to	 challenge	 the	 arbitrator’s	 powers	 as	 a	 ‘party’	 to	 the	
arbitration,	but	these	rights		must	be	exercised	no	later	than	at	the	time	when	he	
takes	 the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 arbitration	 proceedings. 149 	Without	 an	 application	
—	made	in	good	time	—	to	the	supervising	court,	each	class	member	will	be	bound	
by	his	(indirect)	consent	 to	arbitrate	collectively.	 	A	defendant	can	rely	on	that	







apparent	 authority	 of	 the	 representative	 must	 (in	 English	 law)	 derive	 from	 a	
representation	—	express	or	implied	by	conduct	—	by	each	class	member.	150		For	
example	 the	 secretary	 of	 an	 association	 may	 be	 said	 to	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	








































may	 arbitrate	 on	behalf	 of	 all	 consumers,	we	do	not	 believe	 it	 can	do	 so.	 	 The	
authority	of	the	association	to	represent	its	members	in	an	arbitration	depends	on	




Where	 there	 is	 a	 chain	 of	 consent,	 if	 a	 claimant	 brings	 individual	 proceedings	
against	the	defendant	after	the	time	to	challenge	the	arbitrator’s	jurisdiction	in	the	
collective	 arbitration	 has	 passed,	 the	 defendant	will	 be	 able	 to	 compel	 him	 to	
continue	in	the	arbitration	(if	it	is	still	ongoing)	or	to	abide	by	its	outcome.		But	if	





of	 consent	 to	 arbitrate	 at	 all)	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 acute	 where	 the	
representative’s	power	to	act	 is	both	indirect	and	implied	from	the	terms	of	an	
agreement	entered	into	by	the	class	member	for	another	purpose	—	for	example	
the	 articles	 of	 association	of	 a	 club	or	 company.	 	Although	we	believe	 that	 the	
analytical	steps	set	out	above	should	still	be	used,	the	increased	risk	of	defects	in	
the	chain	of	consent	should	mean	that	a	prudent	defendant	ought	to	request	the	
arbitrator	 to	 make	 an	 interim	 award	 confirming	 that	 the	 representative	
ideological	claimant	does	indeed	properly	represent	the	whole	class	presented	to	





















In	 conclusion	 here,	 provided	 that	 each	 class	 member	 has	 given	 either	 direct	
consent	or	a	complete	chain	of	indirect	consent	to	the	arbitration	agreement	—	
itself	formed	through	the	written	terms	agreed	between	the	representative	and	
the	 defendant(s)	 —	 whether	 that	 consent	 is	 express	 or	 implied	 from	 other	
documents	or	conduct,	those	class	members	will	be	bound	to	the	arbitration.		Only	





3.4	 Effect	 of	 group	 member	 jurisdiction	 challenges:	 which	 dispute	 is	
affected?	
	
What	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 successful	 claimant	 challenge	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	








open	 to	 the	 court	 seised	 by	 the	 claimant	 to	 restrain	 the	 collective	 arbitration	





nationality	 of	 the	 applicant.	 	Nor,	 even	on	 enforcement	of	 the	 collective	 award	
against	the	applicant	claimant(s),	should	the	court	seised	(if	outside	the	seat)	use	
its	own	public	policy	criteria	to	assess	the	admissibility	of	the	collective	procedure	



















Thus,	 the	 question	 confronting	 the	 court	 seised	 becomes	 not	 whether	 the	











its	 validity	 on	 the	 express	 or	 implied	 consent	 of	 those	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 the	
arbitration	award.		Where	consent	to	collective	arbitration	is	implied	—	so,	there	
is	no	chain	of	express	consent	to	the	collective	element	of	the	procedure	between	
the	 claimant	 and	 the	 arbitrator	 —	 the	 court	 must	 be	 able	 to	 consider	 if	 the	
implication	is	justified.		The	court	seised	by	the	applicant	should	therefore	be	able	
to	continue	to	hear	his	individual	claim,	unless	it	is	clear	—	as	it	was	in	the	Abaclat	
case	 —	 that	 he	 has	 in	 fact	 already	 irrevocably	 consented	 to	 his	 claim	 being	




Second,	 even	 if	 the	 applicant	 class	 member	 might	 be	 said	 to	 have	 impliedly	















the	 individual	 applicant	 to	be	 able	 to	 exercise	his	 rights	 elsewhere,	 should	 the	
court	 allow	 an	 application	 to	 ‘extract’	 the	 individual	 from	 the	 collective	
arbitration.	 	And,	 if	 the	 application	 is	made	 so	 late	 in	 the	proceedings	 that	 the	














decision	 in	non-EU	 courts.	 In	 this	 section	we	 therefore	offer	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
solutions	 adopted	 in	 the	 US	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 arbitrability	 of	 competition	 class	
claims.164		
	
As	 we	 have	 noted,	 the	 term	 ‘arbitrability’	 as	 used	 in	 US	 practice	 has	 a	 wider	
meaning	—	including	not	only	the	public	policy	aspects	of	referral	to	arbitration	
but	also	interpretation	of	the	scope	of	the	agreement	to	arbitrate.		There	are,	then,	







































The	 decisional	 practice	 of	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 class	
arbitration	 in	 US	 federal	 law	 is	 more	 recent	 and	 the	 court’s	 approval	 of	 this	
procedure	has	been	far	more	guarded.		The	US	Federal	Arbitration	Act	(‘FAA’),169	
whose	 provisions	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 is	 interpreting	 when	 deciding	 on	 the	
availability	of	class	arbitrations,	was	enacted	in	the	first	half	of	the	last	century	to	
ensure	that	arbitration	agreements	were	upheld,	at	a	time	when	judges	in	US	State	










The	 Bazzles,	 along	 with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 other	 borrowers	 from	 commercial	
lender	 Green	 Tree,	 had	 entered	 into	 loan	 agreements	 which	 provided	 that	 all	
disputes	related	to	the	loan	contract	‘shall	be	resolved	by	binding	arbitration	by	one	
arbitrator’.	 	Despite	this,	 the	Bazzles	applied	to	their	 local	State	court	to	have	a	
class	certified	on	behalf	of	themselves	and	the	other	plaintiffs.	Green	Tree	applied	








the	 issue	 of	whether	 its	 scope	 covered	 class	 actions	—	 despite	 the	 conflicting	
views	 of	 the	 parties	 on	 this	 point	 —	 and	 that	 they	 were	 therefore	 impliedly	
permitted	(since	‘all’	disputes	were	to	be	submitted	to	arbitration).	
	
The	US	 Supreme	 Court	 therefore	 had	 to	 decide	 two	 related	 questions:	 did	 the	
silence	of	the	arbitration	clause	on	the	question	of	class	proceedings	mean	that	
they	were	within	the	scope	of	the	clause	(given	its	wide	drafting)	and,	second,	if	
they	 were,	 did	 that	 conclusion	 conflict	 with	 public	 policy	 as	 embodied	 (in	
particular)	in	the	FAA?			
The	Court	decided	that	it	was	for	the	arbitrator	to	interpret	the	contract(s)	—	as	






















claimants	 could	 not	 —	 by	 using	 a	 class	 procedure	 —	 effectively	 impose	 on	












‘late	coming’	claimants	 to	adhere	 to	collective	proceedings	as	 they	stand	at	 the	
moment	of	joining.177		The	same	approach	appears	to	have	been	contemplated	by	








decisions	 (all	 taken	 by	majority)	 demonstrate	 a	 judicial	 policy	which	 requires	
close	reading	of	the	relevant	agreement	to	arbitrate	to	discern	exactly	what	the	

















The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 repeatedly	 emphasized	 that,	 although	 arbitrators	 are	
empowered	 (and	 indeed	 required)	 to	 interpret	 themselves	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
arbitration	clause	on	which	their	appointment	is	based	—	the	internationally	well	
recognized	 principle	 of	Kompetenz-Kompetenz	—	 the	 FAA	 does	 not	 permit	 the	
arbitrator	to	change	that	interpretation	simply	because	he	disagrees	with	it.	There	























































finding	 on	 the	 scope	of	 the	Vegoilvoy	 clause	 for	 two	 reasons.	 	 First,	 there	was	

















In	 certain	 contexts	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	presume	 that	parties	 that	 enter	 into	an	
arbitration	 agreement	 implicitly	 authorize	 the	 arbitrator	 to	 adopt	 such	







that	 the	 arbitrator	may	 infer	 solely	 from	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 parties’	 agreement	 to	
















same	 issue,	we	 suggest	 that	 this	 conflict	may	be	more	 apparent	 than	 real.	 	 	 In	
Abaclat	 the	 parties	 disagreed	 on	 whether	 the	 ICSID	 rules	 under	 which	 the	
arbitration	was	being	 conducted	 impliedly	 allowed	 representative	 actions.	 The	
Tribunal,	exercising	its	Kompetenz-Kompetenz,	decided	they	did.	In	contrast,	in	the	







The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 considered	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 which	 class	
arbitration	 is	 said	 to	 give	 rise	 to	 in	 later	 cases.	 	 In	 Concepcion	 187 	it	 noted	 in	
particular:	
	













were	 permitted,	 the	 plaintiffs’	 costs	 of	 individually	 arbitrating	 their	 federal	
statutory	 claim	 exceeded	 the	 potential	 recovery.	 190 		 The	 doctrine	 of	 ‘effective	
vindication’	 of	 their	 statutory	 rights	 (created	 under	 previous	 Supreme	 Court	








































become	 ‘merely	a	prelude	 to	a	more	cumbersome	and	time	consuming	 judicial	
review	process.’”194	
	




























down	 an	 award	 based	 solely	 on	 a	 ‘policy’	 position	 adopted	 by	 the	 arbitrators	
without	any	grounding	 in	 the	express	or	 implied	consent	of	 the	parties.197		The	
facts	in	Oxford	Health	Plan	—	more	likely	to	arise	in	practice	—	and	the	decision	




cases	 is	 based	 closely	 on	 the	 relatively	 complex	 US	 federal	 class	 action	 rules.		
Those	 rules	 are	 designed	 to	 create	 a	 ‘class’	 of	 persons	 falling	 within	 a	 given	
description,	which	may	extend	well	beyond	a	relatively	well	defined	group	which	
has	 adhered	 to	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 (even	 one	 which	 contemplates	 class	
action).		The	difficulties	of	managing	what	may	be	very	large	groups	of	claimants	
in	an	arbitration	context	have	clearly	motivated	the	Supreme	Court	to	restrict	the	
availability	 of	 class	 arbitration	 strictly	 to	 those	 having	 consented	 to	 it	 (both	





the	 ambit	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 concern	 that	 ‘class’	 action	 fundamentally	
changes	the	nature	of	arbitration	so	that	consent	to	it	cannot	easily	be	implied.		
And	the	Supreme	Court	has	not	excluded	arbitrators	from	using	even	a	complex	
‘class	 action’	 procedure	—	 basing	 themselves	 on	 its	Bazzle	 case	 law	—	 if	 the	
arbitration	tribunal	can	properly	find	that	that	is	what	the	parties	agreed.198	
	








of	 settlement	 by	 arbitration’	 or	 ‘void,	 inoperative	 or	 incapable	 of	 being	
performed’.200				
	
The	 availability	 of	 arbitration	 of	 collective	 claims	 is	 less	 well	 established	 in	
international,	 EU	 or	 national	 laws	—	 and	 is	more	 controversial.	 	 It	 is	 still	 not	
certain	whether	 and	when	 a	national	 civil	 court	 in	 the	EU	may	make	 an	order	
preventing	a	 collective	 competition	arbitration	procedure	 from	continuing,	nor	
how	far	recognition	or	enforcement	of	collective	competition	awards	is	required.		
















2. Questions	 of	 arbitrability	 and	 consent	 raised	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	



















5. In	 contrast,	 questions	 as	 to	 the	 admissibility	 of	 collective	 redress	
procedures	are	properly	a	(preliminary)	question	for	the	arbitrator.	Setting	
aside	 an	 arbitrator’s	 interim	 procedural	 award	 should	 be	 wholly	
exceptional	 and	 (in	 EU	 law	 terms)	 limited	 to	 cases	 where	 a	 party’s	
fundamental	 EU	 rights	 will	 be	 violated	 (a	 ‘serious	 irregularity’	 in	 the	
UK).202	
	
6. The	 primary	 national	 legal	 framework	 —	 including	 public	 policy	 —	
applicable	 to	 decide	 preliminary	 questions	 of	 consent	 is	 the	 law	 of	 the	
arbitration	agreement.	Unless	expressly	chosen,	this	will	either	be	the	law	
chosen	 to	 govern	 the	 substantive	 agreement	 in	 which	 the	 arbitration	
agreement	is	contained,	or	—	if	there	is	an	implication	that	the	parties	must	
have	 intended	 that	 the	 substantive	 law	 should	 not	 apply	 to	 govern	 the	
arbitration	proceedings	—	the	law	of	the	seat.203			
	
7. 	If	 the	 arbitration	 procedure	 decided	 on	 by	 the	 arbitrator	 seriously	
contravenes	ordre	public	as	applied	under	the	lex	arbitri,	the	supervising	
court	may	—	exceptionally	—	be	able	to	restrain	the	collective	arbitration	
from	 continuing.	 In	 contrast,	 where	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 of	 an	











linking	 each	 group	 member	 to	 the	 arbitrator	 by	 whom	 the	 collective	





group	 member	 can	 only	 arise	 where	 the	 representative	 has	 (at	 least)	
apparent	 authority	 to	 represent	 group	 members	 in	 the	 arbitration.		
Consent	 to	 representation	 cannot	 be	 implied	 merely	 through	 passively	
belonging	 to	 a	 group	 of	 persons	 described	 in	 the	 representative’s	
application	 to	 the	 arbitrator	 for	 collective	 proceedings	 (in	 contrast	 to	 a	
‘class’	action	in	a	court).	
	
10. The	 fact	 that	 the	 competition	 dispute	—	 for	 which	 a	 claimant	 group	 is	















12. The	 arbitrator	 (or	 court)	 may	 —	 and	 probably	 must	 —	 determine	 a	
jurisdiction	 application	 as	 a	 preliminary	 issue.	 However,	 that	













14. If	 the	group	member’s	challenge	 is	made	 in	good	time	after	he	has	been	
(actually	or	constructively)	notified	of	the	collective	arbitration	affecting	












for	 a	 court	 to	 be	 able	 entirely	 to	 prohibit	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 collective	
arbitration	of	an	EU	competition	dispute	at	a	defendant’s	or	a	group	member’s	
application.	 	 The	 arbitrator	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 proceed	 using	 his	 chosen	
collective	redress	procedure	consistent	with	the	fundamental	policy	principles	of	
the	proper	law	of	the	arbitration	agreement	and	of	the	lex	arbitri.		In	Europe,	these	
must	 be	 applied	 consistently	 with	 EU	 law	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 general	
principles.				
	












































EU	public	 policy	 towards	 arbitration	 is	 still	 developing	 and	has	 yet	 to	 address	
directly	many	of	the	issues	raised	by	collective	competition	arbitration.		However,	
this	 chapter	 shows	 that	 EU	 policy	 more	 broadly	 can	 and	 should	 be	 used	 to	
encourage	arbitration	of	collective	competition	claims	in	the	EU	Member	States.		




any	application	of	ordre	public	 in	 an	EU	competition	 law	arbitration.	 	Relevant	
distinct	(national)	policy	concerns	are	dealt	with	in	chapter	4,	where	we	discuss	








General	 principles	 of	 law	 —	derived	 from	 a	 comparative	 view	 of	 generally	
accepted	 practice	 in	 national	 legal	 systems	—	have	 been	 examined	 and	 relied	
	 60	
upon	by	arbitrators	(and	academic	commentators)	for	well	over	half	a	century.1		





Most	 of	 the	 general	 principles	 developed	 by	 the	 CJEU	 have	 subsequently	 been	
incorporated	into	the	EU	Treaties	—	either	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU)	







The	 ‘general	 principles’	 of	 EU	 law	 are	 often	 articulated	 using	 methods	 of	
interpretation	 developed	 by	 the	 CJEU	 so	 that,	 where	 the	 text	 of	 EU	 law	 is	
inadequate	or	permits	the	exercise	of	a	discretion,	the	application	of	the	law	(or	
the	discretion)	is	used	to	further	the	overall	purpose	of	the	legal	provision	applied	






of	 collective	 EU	 competition	 disputes.	 	 This	 is	 not	 to	 imply	 that	 other	 general	




























the	 principle	 of	 equivalence	 (the	 same	 procedures	 must	 be	 available	 for	 the	
vindication	of	EU	law	rights	as	are	available	for	the	assertion	of	purely	domestic	
law).	 We	 also	 deal	 with	 the	 impact	 of	 ‘party	 autonomy’.	 	 This	 is	 less	 widely	
recognized	as	a	‘general	principle’	of	EU	law,	but	is	nevertheless	a	common	feature	





The	 right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy	 —	 a	 sub-set	 of	 the	 general	 EU	 principle	 of	
effectiveness	—	finds	its	EU	law	roots	in	the	early	case	law	of	the	CJEU.		The	first	
use	of	 the	principle	 in	the	seminal	Van	Gend	en	Loos	case	 in	1962	ensured	that	











requires	Member	States	 to	provide	remedies	sufficient	 to	ensure	effective	 legal	










unlikely	 that	 a	 commercial	 arbitral	 tribunal	 could	 fully	 satisfy	 the	 detailed	
requirements	 of	 Article	 47.	 	 In	 particular	 the	 Article	 requires	 that	 access	 to	 a	

















arbitrators	 may	 be	 ‘tribunals’	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 ECHR.11			
Arbitrators	are	‘established’	under	relevant	national	arbitration	legislation,	their	
conclusions	are	amenable	to	review	by	an	‘appellate’	jurisdiction	and	their	awards	
may	 be	 enforced	 as	 a	 court	 judgment. 12 		 This	 wide-ranging	 conclusion	 was	
reached	even	though	the	award	under	consideration	by	the	ECtHR	could	only	be	




ECHR	 (and,	 therefore,	 the	 EU	 Charter)	 is	 a	matter	 for	 agreement	 between	 the	
parties	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 arbitrator’s	 procedural	 discretion	 —	 not	 the	
application	of	rules	of	court.	By	choosing	to	arbitrate,	the	parties	have	waived	the	
full	set	of	their	procedural	rights.14	But	it	does	not	follow	from	this	that	arbitrators	
must	 necessarily	 be	 incapable	 of	 impartially	 protecting	 parties’	 fundamental	





How,	 then,	 should	 the	 EU	 legal	 order	 ensure	 the	 adequate	 supervision	 of	
arbitrators’	application	of	 fundamental	EU	rights	—	if	at	all?	 	The	 ‘second	look’	
principle	 first	 used	 in	 the	 EcoSwiss	 case	 for	 competition	 law	 compliance	 by	
arbitrators	will	equally	well	apply	to	the	question	of	whether	other	fundamental	
EU	 public	 policy	 principles	 have	 been	 complied	 with	 by	 an	 arbitrator. 16 	And	
among	them	is	the	right	to	an	effective	remedy	including	—	in	competition	cases	




























clauses	 —	 noting	 in	 any	 event	 that	 the	 question	 was	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	
interpretation	of	the	relevant	EU	Regulation.19	However,	the	findings	of	the	CJEU	
in	relation	to	jurisdiction	clauses	—	that	such	a	clause	can	only	apply	to	prevent	





emphasized,	 despite	 the	 possible	 uncertainty	 in	 national	 application	 resulting	
from	the	CDC	judgment.21		In	particular,	where	an	arbitrator	has	jurisdiction,	the	
effectiveness	principle	will	provide	grounds	to	counter	any	national	public	policy	
arguments	 to	 prevent	 him	 from	 adopting	 a	 (collective)	 procedure	 which	 he	
considers	necessary	to	ensure	an	effective	remedy	for	breach	of	EU	competition	
law. 22 		 National	 courts	 should	 not	 be	 permitted	 to	 interfere	 with	 that	
determination	solely	on	the	basis	of	purely	national	public	policy.	Although	the	






an	 impact	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 successful	 challenge	 to	 the	 arbitrability	 of	 the	
dispute.	 	 The	 types	 of	 collective	 redress	 are	 varied	 and	 there	 is	 no	 clear	















































courts,	 although	 they	 both	 clearly	 recognise	 the	 principle. 33 	However,	 the	
















28	Article 101  
“(1) Extraordinary courts shall not be allowed. No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his 
lawful judge.  
[…] 
Article 103  











by	 law’).34		 As	 some	 commentators	 have	 noted,	 any	 form	 of	 collective	 redress	
(mass,	group,	representative	or	class)	necessarily	requires	a	degree	of	restriction	
of	the	freedom	(autonomy)	of	individual	claimants	forming	part	of	the	claimant	
group.35		 	 It	 follows	 that	 an	 extensive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 party	
autonomy	to	prohibit	any	restriction	on	the	freedom	of	a	claimant	to	participate	












proceedings	—	 so,	 defendants	 cannot	 enjoy	 full	 ‘party	 autonomy’	 in	 the	wider	
sense.37		But	even	a	claimant	may	be	compelled	to	participate	in	civil	proceedings	
in	a	number	of	ways	—	for	example	if	it	is	a	company	whose	shareholders	have	
commenced	 a	 derivative	 claim, 38 	or	 if	 he	 is	 a	 member	 of	 an	 unincorporated	
association	or	partnership	which	is	a	claimant.39		
	










countries’	 international	 obligations	 under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention,	 which	
permits	courts	 in	the	EU	to	recognise	and	enforce	awards	made	by	private	 law	




























procedures	 are	 available	 under	 relevant	 national	 laws,	 in	 order	 to	 show	











Although	 the	 principle	 of	 equivalence	 may	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 overall	
principle	 of	 effectiveness,	 it	 does	 add	 an	 important	 additional	 element.	 	 Even	
where	there	is	effective	national	recourse	against	a	breach	of	a	directly	effective	
EU	law	norm,	if	other	national	(domestic)	procedures	are	available	which	provide	





Determining	 whether	 a	 domestic	 procedure	 is	 ‘similar’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
applying	 the	 EU	 principle	 of	 equivalence	 requires	 the	 court	 or	 arbitrator	 to	
consider	 the	purpose	of	 the	allegedly	equivalent	procedure,	 the	cause	of	action	
and	 the	 ‘essential	 characteristics’	 of	 the	 two	 procedures. 45 	For	 collective	
competition	 claims,	we	 suggest	 that	 this	means	 that	—	provided	 that	 they	 are	























How	 far	 can	a	national	 collective	 redress	procedure	specific	 to	another	area	of	
substantive	 law	—	for	example,	 financial	 services	—	be	applied	 in	competition	
cases	using	the	EU	principle	of	equivalence?		The	three	criteria	to	be	applied	—	
similar	purpose,	similar	cause	of	action	and	similar	‘essential	characteristics’	—	















arbitration	 agreement	 or	 of	 the	 lex	 arbitri. 51 		 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	
failure	 to	 apply	 a	 procedure	 equivalent	 to	 the	 ‘most	 favourable’	 and	 ‘similar’	
litigation	procedure	available	under	relevant	national	rules	may	be	grounds	for	
challenging	the	arbitrator’s	exercise	of	his	procedural	discretion	in	a	court	in	the	
EU.	 	 At	 least,	 the	 arbitrator	 will	 need	 to	 consider	 other	 —	 allegedly	 more	




















collective	 competition	 award	 on	 a	 ‘second	 look’	 to	 ensure	 compliance	with	EU	

























ongoing,	 courts	 are	 in	 practice	 reluctant	 to	 intervene.59		We	 suggest	 that	 they	
certainly	 should	 not	 do	 so	 where	 the	 arbitrator	 has	 adopted	 an	 equivalent	

























refusal	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	enforcement	 ‘second	 look’	 to	 recognise	 the	 collective	
award	 in	an	EU	competition	matter	will	 also	need	 to	measure	procedural	non-
compliance	against	both	the	fundamental	principles	forming	part	of	the	European	
Union’s	 public	 policy	 and	 also	 ordre	 public	 as	 applied	 to	 international	
arbitration.60	
	









































whom	 are	 not	 within	 its	 legislated	 representative	 authority	 —	 for	 example,	
because	 they	reside	outside	 the	region	 in	which	 it	operates.	 	Given	 the	general	
principle	of	 international	 law	that	arbitrators	have	Kompetenz-Kompetenz64	and	
the	 similarly	 generally	 accepted	 requirement	 that	 national	 courts	 should	 only	
intervene	in	arbitrations	on	public	policy	grounds	in	exceptional	circumstances,	
we	believe	 that	 challenges	 to	 the	arbitration	procedure	 in	 these	 circumstances	
should	 fail.	 	 The	 arbitrator’s	 decision	 on	 the	 suitability	 of	 the	 representative	
should	be	allowed	to	stand	 in	the	absence	of	 ‘serious	 irregularity’	 in	the	award	
regardless	of	the	detail	of	national	law	restrictions	on	standing.65	
	
The	 second	 situation	 is	 where	 the	 intended	 representative	 in	 the	 arbitration	
cannot,	on	any	objective	basis,	meet	the	criteria	set	out	in	an	applicable	law.66	An	
example	is	where	the	national	law	requires	the	representative	to	be	an	association	






the	 example	 above,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 proposed	 individual	
representative	are	so	substantially	in	conflict	with	some	(or	even	all)	of	the	other	






collective	 redress	mechanisms,	we	 have	 already	 noted	 that	 the	 CJEU	 takes	 the	
view	 that,	 where	 any	 directly	 effective	 EU	 law	 right	 (eg.	 to	 compensation	 for	
breach	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	 rules)	 is	 engaged,	 the	 principle	 of	 equivalence	
applies	if	there	are	more	favourable	rules	applying	to	domestic	actions	having	a	
similar	purpose.69	So,	the	arbitrator’s	exercise	of	his	competence	should	only	be	
interfered	with	where	 he	 applies	 a	 collective	 procedure	 designed	 for	 litigating	
disputes	wholly	removed	from	the	bounds	of	the	‘defined	legal	relationship’	which	
is	the	subject	of	the	arbitration.	It	is	in	any	case	highly	unlikely	that	the	parties	can	


















procedure	 in	 a	 relevant	 European	 law,	 consistent	 with	 the	 parties’	 consent	 to	
arbitrate.	
	










best	 equivalent	 collective	 procedure	 available	 in	 the	 EU	 where	 the	 arbitrator	
considers	it	is	necessary	properly	to	resolve	the	dispute	before	him	in	accordance	
with	the	agreement	of	the	parties	to	arbitrate.		There	appears	to	be	no	reason	to	






















themselves	 provide	 that	 pre-accession	 treaties	 with	 non-EU	 Member	 States	



















However	 where	 the	 international	 law	 provision	 appears	 to	 offend	 against	
fundamental	principles	of	international	law	(jus	cogens),	EU	law	may	exceptionally	
override	even	international	law	within	the	EU.	In	Kadi	the	CJEU	Grand	Chamber	
annulled	 a	 General	 Court	 judgment	 upholding	 the	 validity	 of	 an	 EU	 regulation	





one).	 This	 judgment	 has	 been	 criticized	 by	 commentators,	 and	 its	 correctness	
doubted	by	the	General	Court	itself,	but	remains	EU	law.	77	
	
It	 is	 doubtful	 whether	 any	 policy	 objection	 to	 collective	 competition	 redress	
proceedings	—	even	(opt-out)	class	actions	—	is	so	fundamental	as	to	engage	the	
Kadi	 principle.	A	number	of	Member	States	have	opt-out	 representative	 claims	
mechanisms	 and	 they	 are	 also	 an	 established	 feature	 of	 developed	 litigation	
systems	elsewhere	in	the	world.78		Clearly,	they	cannot	be	said	to	be	contrary	to	




























• the	Regulation	does	not	apply	 to	applications	 to	 the	court	of	 the	 seat	of	
arbitration	relating	to	(among	other	things)	the	power	of	the	arbitrator	to	




















principle	 of	 ‘sincere	 co-operation’	 between	 Member	 States	 (and	 therefore	
between	 their	 courts). 82 		 This	 duty	 of	 ‘sincere	 co-operation’	 also	 extends	 to	









two	 or	 more	 arbitral	 tribunals	 applying	 EU	 law	 depends	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
parties’	agreement	to	arbitrate	and	the	requirements	of	the	law(s)	applicable	to	











closely	 connected	 that	 they	 could	be	 consolidated	 into	 a	 single	 arbitration,	 the	




The	 CJEU	 has	 held	 that,	 if	 arbitrators	 have	 failed	 apply	 EU	 competition	 law	
properly	when	reaching	their	decisions,	their	awards	should	be	set	aside	by	courts	
of	 Member	 States	 on	 enforcement	 —	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 EU	 public	 policy	 —	 in	




be	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 EU	 ‘mutual	 trust’	 system,	 based	 on	 ‘sincere	 co-










































EU	 law	 framework	 for	 recognizing	 ‘judgments’. 94 		 But	 an	 enforcing	 court	 is	
nevertheless	 required	 to	consider	EU	competition	 law	 issues	as	a	public	policy	
question	on	a	‘second	look’.95		There	is,	therefore,	a	clear	possibility	of	diverging	




Article	4(3)	TEU	 requires	Member	States	—	and	 their	 courts	—	 to	 respect	 the	
principle	 of	 ‘sincere	 co-operation’	 whenever	 they	 are	 applying	 EU	 law.	 EU	








We	 therefore	 believe	 that,	 when	 enforcing	 competition	 arbitration	 awards,	
national	 courts	 in	 the	 EU	 are	 required	 to	 have	 due	 regard	 to	 recognition	 and	




in	 the	 unfortunate	 position	 of	 having	 to	 choose	 between	 two	 incompatible	










































and	 so	 to	 ‘enable	 injured	 parties	 to	 obtain	 compensation	 in	 mass	 harm	








































The	collective	 redress	Recommendation	 is	 clearly	designed	 to	prompt	Member	
States	 to	 introduce	 effective	 collective	 court	 procedures	 in	 relation	 all	 directly	
effective	EU	law	rights.		But	the	effect	of	the	Recommendation	will	be	magnified	in	
those	areas	of	EU	law	where	there	is	complementary	EU	legislation	on	redress:	
this	 is	particularly	 true	of	damages	claims	against	 infringers	of	EU	competition	
law.	 	 The	 competition	damages	Directive	 contains	 significant	 harmonization	of	
civil	procedure	rules	for	claims	under	(directly	effective)	EU	competition	law	in	
national	 courts	—	 including	 in	 relation	 to	ADR.	107		 	 The	Recommendation	also	
addresses	the	need	for	collective	ADR.108	How	far	does	it	affect	the	exercise	by	an	
arbitrator	 of	 his	 procedural	 discretion	 —	 given	 that	 he	 is	 not	 bound	 by	 any	
national	litigation	procedure	rules	—	when	resolving	the	collective	competition	
















collective	 arbitration	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 statement	 in	 the	
Recommendation	 that	 all	 Member	 States	 (and	 therefore	 their	 civil	 procedure	
rules)	should	have	effective	collective	redress	procedures	—	including	collective	














What,	 then,	 does	 the	 Recommendation	 say	 about	 collective	 ADR?	 	 The	
recommendations	on	ADR	are	brief,	but	potentially	far-reaching:	





be	 available	 as	 a	 complement	 to,	 and	 in	 conjunction	 with,	 litigated	 collective	
redress	 solutions?	 	We	 think	 this	 would	 be	 a	misreading	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
position,	 particularly	 given	 the	 overall	 purpose	 of	 the	 Recommendation	 to	
promote	 redress	 through	 collective	 claims. 111 	Some	 ‘softer’	 forms	 of	 ADR	 —	
mediation	being	a	good	example	—	are	normally	used	in	conjunction	(or	at	least	
closely	 coordinated)	 with	 litigation.	 	 But	 ADR	methods	 envisaged	 in	 other	 EU	
legislation	—	particularly	the	competition	damages	Directive	and	the	consumer	
ADR	Directive	—	 clearly	 include	binding	 forms	of	ADR,	 principally	 arbitration,	
which	are	commonly	used	on	a	‘stand-alone’	basis.112		Given	the	close	connection	
between	 the	Recommendation	and	(in	particular)	 the	damages	Directive	 in	 the	






















There	 are,	 however,	 two	 issues	 arising	 from	 the	Recommendation	which	 need	
careful	 consideration	 by	 any	 representative	 claimant	 (or,	 if	 necessary,	 the	
























here.	 	 Where	 the	 representative	 brings	 a	 collective	 competition	 claim	 to	
arbitration,	it	can	necessarily	only	be	with	the	consent	to	arbitrate	of	the	group	
that	 he	 claims	 to	 represent.	 	 There	must	 be	 some	 expression	 of	 consent	 to	 be	
bound	by	the	outcome	of	 the	arbitration	proceedings	—	absolute	silence	 is	not	




supervising	 court. 119 		 This	 means,	 we	 believe,	 that	 all	 forms	 of	 collective	
competition	arbitration	should	be	characterized	as	‘opt-in’	for	the	purposes	of	the	
Recommendation:	 the	 award	 can	 only	 bind	 those	 who	 have	 consented	 to	 the	
proceedings.120	
	











collective	 competition	 disputes)	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 ADR	 provisions	 in	 the	
competition	damages	Directive,	provides	a	substantial	EU	impetus	for	arbitrators	

































the	scope	and	purpose	of	 the	Directive	and	second	(and	also	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	
Recommendation)	that	it	covers	collective	dispute	resolution.124			
		








court	 settlements	 (including	 those	 where	 the	 judge	 can	 declare	 a	 settlement	





Two	 principles	 emerge	 clearly	 from	 this	 statement	 of	 purpose.	 First,	 ADR	
















any	 pending	 cases	 for	 up	 to	 two	 years	 to	 allow	 ADR	 to	 go	 forward.	 	 This	
requirement	to	stay	is	expressed	to	be	‘without	prejudice’	to	national	arbitration	
rules.125		The	exception	appears	to	be	needed	to	allow	national	courts	to	refer	a	




Article	 19	 requires	 ‘consensual	 settlements’	 of	 one	 of	 several	 claims	 to	 be	
automatically	carved	out	of	the	continuing	proceedings	—	requiring	change	in	the	
laws	of	several	Member	States,	including	England.126		 ‘Consensual	settlement’	in	

















EU	 law	 to	 questions	 arising	 from	 collective	 competition	 arbitrations.	 The	 twin	















of	 Loss	 or	 Damage	 arising	 from	 Competition	 Infringements	 (Competition	 Act	 1998	 and	 Other	






In	 particular,	 the	 damages	 Directive	 expressly	 reiterates	 the	 two	 principles	 of	























arbitrators,	 in	a	pair	of	 cases	 in	 the	early	1980s.	 	 It	decided	 that	 in	most	cases	
arbitration	 tribunals	 fall	 outside	 the	 ‘mutual	 trust’	 system,	 but	 with	 some	
exceptions.131			
	
In	Nordsee	 the	 CJEU	 decided	 that	 a	 private	 law	 arbitrator	 could	 not	 make	 an	
admissible	reference	to	the	Court	under	Art	177	EEC	(now	Art	267	TFEU).	132		Its	
reasons	for	reaching	this	conclusion	were	twofold.		First,	it	noted	that	the	parties	
to	 the	arbitration	 in	question	had	chosen	(by	 including	an	arbitration	clause	 in	
their	 agreement)	 to	 take	 themselves	 outside	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 ordinary	
courts.133		Second,	on	the	facts	of	that	case,	there	was	no	involvement	of	the	public	




















disputes	 involving	 its	members,	was	 able	 to	make	 a	 request	 for	 a	 preliminary	
ruling.135			Although	membership	of	the	association	was	technically	voluntary,	in	
practice	 most	 Dutch	 general	 practitioners	 had	 to	 belong	 to	 it	 since	 the	 Dutch	
health	 insurance	 system	 only	 reimbursed	 treatment	 provided	 by	 registered	
members.	 	 Further,	 and	 importantly,	 the	 Dutch	 state	 intervened	 in	 the	









will	 fall	 into	 the	Nordsee	 category,	 even	 if	 a	number	of	 arbitrators	 called	on	 to	




operation	 system	 has	 nevertheless	 led	 to	 two	 incursions	 into	 arbitration	



































it	 would	 if	 a	 challenge	 had	 been	 made	 on	 other	 ordre	 public	 grounds.	141 		 EU	
competition	law	forms	part	of	EU	public	policy.142	Any	attempt	to	exclude	entirely	
an	EU	public	policy	review	by	a	national	court	at	the	time	of	enforcement	of	an	














West	 Tankers	 sought	 to	 rely	 on	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 the	 (standard	 form)	
charter	party,	which	provided	 for	binding	arbitration	of	all	disputes	 in	London	
under	English	law,	despite	the	defendant	having	seised	the	court	in	the	place	of	
the	 tortious	 act	 (Syracuse	 in	 Sicily).	 	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 defendant	 from	







The	 CJEU,	 held,	 in	 essence,	 that	 the	 system	 of	 ‘mutual	 trust’	 between	 national	






















However,	 this	 rule	does	not	apply	 to	 (interim)	arbitration	awards	seeking,	 in	a	
similar	 way,	 to	 prevent	 foreign	 litigation	 which	 overlaps	 with	 the	 pending	
arbitration.146		The	CJEU	addressed	this	question	in	rather	unusual	circumstances	
in	 its	Gazprom	decision.147		Gazprom	and	 the	Lithuanian	state	were	engaged	 in	
arbitration	in	Stockholm	over	a	dispute	arising	from	a	shareholders’	agreement.	
In	parallel	the	Lithuanian	state	commenced	proceedings	in	the	Lithuanian	courts	
in	 respect	 of	 matters	 which	 overlapped	 with	 the	 dispute	 being	 arbitrated	 in	
Stockholm.	 	Gazprom	obtained	an	 interim	award	requiring	Lithuania	 to	 refrain	




















































direct	 purchasers’	 cartel	 claims,	 the	 defendants	 —	 previously	 found	 by	 the	
European	Commission	 to	have	participated	 in	an	 infringing	hydrogen	peroxide	
cartel	—	pleaded	that	a	large	number	of	the	contracts	under	which	the	chemical	
had	been	purchased	from	them	contained	either	arbitration	clauses	or	jurisdiction	
clauses	 granting	 jurisdiction	 to	 non-EU	 civil	 courts.	 	 They	 argued	 that	 these	
clauses	meant	that	the	German	court	initially	seised	did	not	have	jurisdiction	to	







scope	 of	 the	 Brussels	 Regulation	 —	 which	 means	 that	 their	 interpretation	 is	




those	 implementing	a	Member	State’s	 international	 law	obligations)	should	not	
allow	an	arbitration	clause	to	prejudice	the	full	effectiveness	of	the	EU	law	right	to	
compensation	for	cartel	harm.155		He	said:	
‘[…]	 I	 find	 it	 hard	 to	 accept	 that	 jurisdiction	 […]	 could	 be	 excluded	when	 the	














party	 to	 the	 contract	 and	 stemming	 from	 relationships	 other	 than	 that	 in	
connection	with	which	the	clause	at	issue	was	agreed.		The	requirement	of	a	close	
connection	 between	 the	 clause	 invoked	 and	 a	 particular	 legal	 relationship	 […]	
seems	 to	me	 to	 be	 necessary	 here	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 the	 predictability	 of	
jurisdiction’.	156	
	
This	 conclusion	 is	 open	 to	 criticism	on	 a	 number	 of	 grounds.	 	 The	 first	 is	 that	
















Convention	 pre-date	 those	 arising	 from	 their	 accession	 to	 the	 EU	 Treaties	—	
which	are	‘without	prejudice’	to	such	pre-existing	international	obligations.161			
	









the	 principle	 of	 effectiveness	 should	 in	 some	 circumstances	 be	 permitted	 to	



















Nevertheless,	 the	CJEU	did	note	that	 the	national	court	had	to	be	clear	that	 the	
(jurisdiction)	clause	did	indeed	cover	the	dispute	in	question.	It	thus	appeared	to	




in	 the	 UK	 on	 this	 issue 166 	—	 it	 is	 relatively	 easy	 to	 make	 such	 a	 step.	 The	




there	was	 not	 a	 sufficient	 connection	 between	 the	 arbitration	 clauses	 and	 the	
competition	claims	brought	by	CDC	to	require	it	to	refer	the	claims	to	arbitration.		
There	were	‘no	good	grounds’	for	not	applying	the	CJEU’s	analysis	in	CDC	(given	
in	relation	to	 jurisdiction	clauses)	also	to	 the	arbitration	clauses	 in	question.168		
However,	 in	 contrast,	 both	 the	 English	 and	 German	 courts	 have	 declined	 in	
different	cartel	cases	to	follow	the	lead	set	by	the	Advocate	General	in	CDC.169	
	
The	 CJEU’s	 understandable	 reluctance	 to	 rule	 on	 arbitration	 questions,	 and	 its	
apparent	desire	 to	maintain	 the	 ‘bright	 line’	 separating	 commercial	 arbitration	
and	 EU	 enforcement	 of	 civil	 judgments	 is	 to	 be	 welcomed. 170 		 However,	 the	
perceived	need	to	maintain	the	ability	of	national	courts	in	the	EU	to	ensure	the	







an	 arbitration	 proceeding	 (or	 at	 least	 the	 resulting	 award)	 the	 agreement	 to	
arbitrate	may	be	void.		In	Slovakia	v	Achmea	BV,	the	CJEU	(Grand	Chamber)	held	
that	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 a	 bi-lateral	 investment	 treaty	 (BIT)	 concluded	


















rise	 to	 disputes	 involving	 directly	 effective	 EU	 law	which	 the	 Dutch	 investors	
would	 then	be	entitled	 to	put	 to	an	arbitration	panel	 (under	UNCITRAL	rules).		
Achmea	BV	—	a	Dutch	investor	in	the	Slovak	healthcare	system	—	requested	an	
arbitration	 under	 the	 BIT	 to	 take	 place	 in	 Frankfurt	 am	 Main.	 	 The	 German	
supervising	 court	—	seised	 of	 a	 jurisdiction	 challenge	 by	 Slovakia	—	referred	
questions	 to	 the	 CJEU	 on	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 inter-State	 arbitration	
mechanism	with	EU	law.			
	




since	both	 states	were	 required	not	 to	 allow	 their	 courts	 to	 review	 the	 award.				
Thus	the	clause	as	agreed	was	contrary	to	both	countries’	obligations	to	ensure	
uniform	 judicial	 interpretation	 of	 EU	 law	 in	 their	 territories.174	But	 the	 CJEU’s	
reasoning	 (expressly)	 did	 not	 apply	 to	 commercial	 arbitration,	 since	 there	 the	
(private)	parties	to	similar	arbitration	clauses	are	not	able	to	prevent	a	national	





Paris	 referred	 questions	 on	 recognition	 of	 an	 arbitration	 award	 enforcing	 an	
agreement	 against	 Genentech,	 which	 Genentech	 had	 argued	 (unsuccessfully)	
before	the	arbitrator	infringed	EU	competition	rules.		French	law	(the	lex	arbitri	
—	the	arbitration	was	being	conducted	in	Paris	under	the	ICC	Rules)	only	permits	
a	French	court	 to	refuse	 to	recognise	an	 international	arbitration	award	where	
































context	 of	 an	 action	 for	 annulment	 or	 proceedings	 for	 recognition	 or	
enforcement.”180	
	
The	 Advocate	 General	 said	 that	 he	 was	 here	 following	 the	 line	 set	 out	 in	 the	
EcoSwiss	decision.	But	the	CJEU’s	decision	on	depth	of	scrutiny	in	EcoSwiss	was	
relatively	laisser-faire:	although	there	must	be	a	review181	
“….	 the	ordinary	courts	may	have	 to	examine	 [EU	 law]	questions,	 in	particular	









































—	 with	 the	 ‘bright	 line’	 separating	 commercial	 arbitration	 and	 EU	 civil	
enforcement	 legislation	 through	 national	 courts	 drawn	 by	 the	 CJEU	 in	 in	 its	
Nordsee,	Gazprom	and	Achmea	decisions.	187	
	
Despite	 the	 continuing	 careful	 stance	 of	 the	 CJEU	 —	 fearing	 to	 tread	 where	
Advocates	General	would	rush	in	—	we	suggest	that,	at	the	least,	careful	crafting	
and	 interpretation	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 and	 arbitration	 procedure	 in	
competition	disputes	 is	now	clearly	needed	to	navigate	the	current	state	of	 the	
CJEU’s	 decisional	 practice.	 	 	 We	 discuss	 this	 further	 in	 chapter	 4:	 there	 is,	








competition	 claims	 has	 clearly	 been	 recognized	—	 not	 least	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	—	 this	does	not	prevent	 such	disputes	 from	being	arbitrated,	 and	
they	commonly	are.	188		
	
However,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 CJEU	 jurisprudence,	 the	 recognition	 of	 arbitration	





We	 nevertheless	 believe	 that	 general	 EU	 law	 principles	 —	 in	 particular	 the	
principles	 of	 effectiveness	 and	 equivalence	 —	 as	 well	 as	 recent,	 focused,	 EU	
legislation	 and	 guidance	 on	 competition	 and	 collective	 redress,	 substantially	
reinforce	the	impetus	for	recognition	and	enforcement	of	collective	competition	






















is	 both	 permitted	 and	 —	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 —	 required	 in	 EU	 law,	 the	
international	commercial	arbitration	system,	established	under	the	New	York	
Convention,	continues	 to	apply	 in	 full	 in	 the	EU.	 	Only	wholly	exceptionally,	
where	 an	 international	 rule	 violates	 (international)	 jus	 cogens,	 should	 a	
national	 court	 in	 the	 EU	 decline	 to	 enforce	 the	 international	 rule	 when	









4. EU	public	 policy	 includes	 respect	 for	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 EU	 law	





collective	 redress	 and	 competition	 damages	 procedure,	 is	 in	 favour	 of	














8. Arbitrators	 do	 not	 (normally)	 form	 part	 of	 the	 ‘mutual	 trust’	 system	
comprising	 EU	 civil	 courts	 and	 the	 CJEU,	 which	 ensures	 the	 effective	 and	





9. The	degree	of	 scrutiny	of	 an	arbitration	proceeding	or	 award	by	a	national	
court	 on	 EU	 public	 policy	 grounds	 is	 not	 (as	 yet)	 well	 articulated	 in	 the	
decisional	practice	of	the	CJEU.	It	is	likely	to	vary	according	to	the	EU	principle	
which	 is	 said	 to	 be	 infringed	 and	 the	 national	 arbitration	 legislation	 of	 the	





the	 seat	 of	 arbitration,	 seised	 of	 an	 application	 to	 recognize	 or	 enforce	 an	
arbitration	agreement	or	award,	to	disregard	restrictions	(in	its	own	law)	as	








11. The	 CJEU	 may	 in	 future	 seek	 to	 require	 a	 restrictive	 interpretation	 of	 the	
necessary	closeness	of	the	relationship	between	the	dispute	to	be	arbitrated	
and	the	arbitration	agreement.		And	there	are	already	indications	that	national	
courts	are	 taking	a	narrower	view	of	 the	 scope	of	 arbitration	clauses	when	
considering	their	jurisdiction	over	EU	competition	law	disputes.	However	—	
given	that	international	commercial	arbitration	is	a	separate	system	to	the	EU	
‘mutual	 trust’	 civil	 judgment	 enforcement	 architecture	—	deciding	whether	
the	 arbitration	 agreement	 gives	 the	 arbitrator	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 dispute	




























2. Risk	 management	 during	 the	 arbitration:	 ‘substantive	 jurisdiction’	 and	
procedure	challenges	
2.1. Finding	the	applicable	law	in	multiparty	cases	
2.1.1. the	 defined	 legal	 relationship	 and	 its	 connection	 to	 the	 dispute	 in	
arbitration	
2.1.2. collective	contractual	competition	claims	—	the	proper	law	





















Effective	management	of	 risks	 to	a	 collective	 competition	arbitration	 in	 the	EU	
requires	 a	 clear	 view	 of	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 arbitration	 proceedings.	 	 As	 with	 all	
arbitrations,	the	primary	aim	must	be	to	resolve	the	dispute	between	the	parties.1		




















of	 number	 of	 claimants	 covered	 and	 territorial	 reach	 of	 the	 award. 4 		 For	





through	 collective	 competition	 arbitration	 might	 arise.	 	 We	 then	 consider	 the	







Accepted	 international	 arbitration	 practice	 indicates	 that	 court	 intervention	 in	
international	commercial	arbitration	should	be	exceptional.5		Arbitrators	are	the	
masters	of	their	own	procedure,	within	the	parties’	consent,	and	the	large	majority	






but	 only	 if	 either	 all	 of	 the	 parties	 agree	 to	 the	 application	 or	with	 the	
permission	of	the	arbitrator	and	where	there	is	a	good	reason	for	a	court	
to	hear	the	application	(where	this	would	save	time	or	cost);	


























procedure)	 should	 be	 set	 aside.	 	 Or	 third,	 that	 the	 arbitrator’s	 approval	 of	 a	
representative	(in	representative	collective	claims)	is	impermissible.	
	
Each	 of	 these	 bases	 reflects	 a	 ‘due	 process’	 concern’	 with	 collective	 redress	
proceedings	 —	 but	 of	 course	 can	 only	 be	 successfully	 asserted	 against	 an	







Arbitrators	 enjoy	 considerable	 procedural	 freedom	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 their	
jurisdiction.8		However,	 both	 the	 law	of	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 and	 the	 lex	
arbitri	may	be	important	in	providing	the	legal	(and	thus	public	policy)	framework	
within	which	the	arbitrator	must	work.	An	arbitrator	should,	therefore,	consider	
which	 law	 applies	 to	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 when	 framing	 his	 collective	
procedure		in	a	competition	claim.9		This	should		avoid	any	erroneous	conclusions	

































arbitrations	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 EU)	 due	 to	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 EU	 law	
underpinning	 all	 Member	 States’	 public	 policy	 in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 EU	
competition	 law.	 	 The	 EU	 competition	 ‘damages	 Directive’	 will	 also	 begin	 to	
prompt	 the	 harmonisation	 of	 national	 competition	 litigation	 procedures. 13	
Differences	 in	 EU	 Member	 States’	 public	 policy	 in	 relation	 to	 procedures	 for	
recovering	 losses	 caused	 by	 competition	 infringements	 should	 therefore	
progressively	diminish	over	 time.	 	Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 foreseeable	 future,	 the	





Indeed,	 a	 first	 differentiation	 based	 on	 the	 concepts	 the	 proper	 law	 of	 the	
arbitration	 agreement	 and	 the	 lex	 arbitri,	 may	 be	 too	 simplistic	 in	 collective	
competition	arbitrations.	Each	of	the	three	legal	systems	which	can	apply	to	the	












the	 specific	 issues	 on	 choice	 of	 law	 arising	 in	 non-contractual	 collective	
competition	arbitrations.		
	
2.1.1. The	 ‘defined	 legal	 relationship’	 and	 its	 connection	 to	 the	
dispute	in	arbitration	
	
International	 arbitration	 law	 and	 practice	 only	 require	 the	 recognition	 of	








legal	 relationship’.15		 The	 question	 of	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 sufficient	 connection	
between	each	dispute	marshalled	in	a	collective	competition	arbitration	and	the	
agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 is	 one	 of	 ‘substantive	 jurisdiction’	 rather	 than	 one	 of	












now	 have	 civil	 litigation	 procedures	 permitting	 collective	 redress	 actions,	 a	
number	still	prohibit	advanced	forms	of	collective	procedure	—	in	particular	‘opt-
out’	 representative	 actions.	 	 It	 may	 not	 be	 open	 to	 an	 arbitrator,	 deriving	 his	
jurisdiction	from	an	agreement	governed	by	such	a	national	law,	to	admit	the	most	
advanced	collective	techniques	by	implication	—	the	risk	of	challenge	on	referral	







The	 leading	English	 authority	 on	 the	 reach	 of	 an	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 is	 the	
judgment	in	Fiona	Trust.22		The	House	of	Lords	found	that	English	law	gives	effect	
—	as	far	as	the	language	of	the	arbitration	clause	permits	—	to	the	commercial	

























The	arbitration	 clause	 in	 the	 charter	party	 in	 the	Fiona	Trust	 case	 extended	 to	
requiring	that	an	allegation	that	the	charter	as	a	whole	—	including	the	arbitration	
clause	 —	 had	 been	 procured	 by	 fraud	 (bribery)	 should	 be	 decided	 by	 the	





jurisdiction	 to	decide	 this	 jurisdiction	point.	 	The	arbitration	agreement	can	be	





This	decisional	practice	has	been	 followed	 in	 competition	 cases	by	 the	English	








insufficient	 in	 English	 law	 simply	 to	 point	 to	 the	 commission	 of	 a	 competition	
infringement	and	claim	that	there	is	an	implied	term	in	a	supply	contract	with	the	




about	 foreseeability	of	scope	of	 forum	agreements	expressed	by	the	CJEU	in	 its	
CDC	judgment.30		As	the	Court	of	Appeal	noted	—	commenting	on	the	Fiona	Trust	



































• the	alleged	breach	of	contract	was	 that	 the	prices	—	inflated	by	a	cartel	
—	charged	to	Microsoft	were	not	negotiated	in	good	faith.		There	was	an	
express	 clause	 in	 the	 supply	 agreement	 requiring	 good	 faith	 price	
negotiation;	
• the	court	appeared	to	accept	that	engaging	in	a	cartel	—	even	with	non-
parties	 to	 the	contract	 in	dispute	—	in	relation	 to	 the	products	supplied	
under	the	contract	was	necessarily	a	breach	of	good	faith;33	
• a	rational	businessman	would	have	intended	—	at	the	time	the	agreement	
to	 arbitrate	 was	 made	 —	that	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 covered	 both	 the	
(contractual)	‘bad	faith’	claims	and	tortious	(breach	of	duty)	competition	
claims.	 	 It	did	not	matter	 that	 the	contractual	 claims	had	not	 (yet)	been	
pleaded	 as	 long	 as	 they	 were	 ‘parallel’	 to	 the	 tortious	 claims	 actually	
advanced;34	
• the	strength	of	the	contractual	claims	was,	however,	clearly	relevant	to	the	
expectations	 of	 a	 rational	 businessman	 at	 the	 time	 the	 arbitration	
agreement	 was	 made.	 	 If	 they	 were	 too	 factually	 convoluted	 then	 they	
would	not	be	sufficient	to	create	a	parallel	link	with	claims	for	damages	for	
breach	of	(non-contractual)	duty	not	to	infringe	competition	law;35		
• the	 ability	 to	 arbitrate	 the	 non-contractual	 claims	 under	 the	 arbitration	
clause	was	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 CJEU’s	CDC	 decision.	 	 The	 court	was	 not	
bound	by	the	Advocate	General’s	opinion	(relied	on	by	Microsoft	to	resist	
a	 stay	 for	 arbitration)	 and	 the	 CJEU’s	 judgment	 did	 not	 apply	 to	
arbitration;36	



















German	 legislation.38		 Broad	 interpretations	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 ‘defined	 legal	
relationship’	are	also	accepted	elsewhere.39		It	is	also	—	perhaps	parenthetically	
—	worth	 noting	 that	 most	 legal	 systems	 in	 Europe	 require	 good	 faith	 in	 the	
creation	 and	 performance	 of	 contractual	 obligations	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
express	terms.40			
	
The	 other	 main	 source	 of	 (mandatory)	 public	 policy	 rules	 which	 govern	 an	




of	 arbitrators	 to	 set	 their	own	procedure	 in	 the	 absence	of	party	 agreement	 is	
almost	 universally	 recognised. 42 		 For	 procedural	 matters,	 although	 the	 public	
policy	of	the	law	of	the	arbitration	agreement	will	be	very	relevant,	in	the	highly	
unlikely	case	of	unavoidable	conflict	between	the	permitted	scope	of	agreement	
to	 arbitrate	 —	the	 public	 policy	 limits	 on	 the	 parties’	 ability	 to	 consent	 to	 a	
collective	procedure	—	and	the	public	policy	of	the	 lex	arbitri,	 the	latter	should	






particular,	 the	 CJEU’s	 view	 that	 “all	 dispute”	 clauses	 may	 not	 extend	 to	 non-
contractual	 competition	 damages	 clams	 —	 as	 indicated	 in	 CDC 44 	—	 is	 now	





















arbitration	 clauses)	 and	 also	 generally	 accepted	 international	 arbitration	
practice.46		We	have,	however,	already	noted,	first	that	the	English	courts	have	also	
expressed	similar	concerns	about	foreseeability	of	expectations	and,	second,	that	







significant	 number	 of	 claimants	 have	 purchased	 directly	 from	 the	 infringing	
defendant,	 and	 did	 so	 under	 related	 standard	 form	 contracts	 containing	 a	
sufficiently	 similar	 arbitration	 clause,	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 for	 these	 contractual	
claims	 —	based	 on	 breach	 of	 a	 contractual	 duty	 of	 good	 faith	 or	 on	
misrepresentation	—	to	be	asserted	 in	a	 single	 collective	arbitration	under	 the	
‘related	contracts’	doctrine.47		The	preliminary	issue	to	be	addressed	—	whether,	







rehearsed	 elsewhere. 48 		 The	 2012	 revisions	 to	 the	 ICC	 arbitration	 Rules	
introduced	provisions	allowing	disputes	in	related	contracts	to	be	dealt	with	in	a	
single	arbitration.49		However,	the	ICC	Court	—	or	an	arbitrator	already	appointed	









Although	EU	 legislation	—	 the	 ‘Rome	 I’	Regulation51	—	sets	 out	 clear	 rules	 for	
choosing	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 a	 (commercial)	 contractual	 relationship,	
arbitration	agreements	(taken	separately	from	any	substantive	contract	in	which	



















English	courts	normally	 imply	 the	express	choice	of	 law	(if	 there	 is	one)	 in	 the	
substantive	 contract	 to	 which	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 relates	 —	 although	 this	
implication	can	be	displaced	by	other	factors.55		But	if	there	is	no	express	choice	
of	 law	 even	 in	 the	 substantive	 contract	 —	or	 the	 claim	 is	 made	 on	 a	 non-
contractual	 basis	 —	the	 lex	 arbitri	 will	 normally	 be	 used	 as	 the	 law	 of	 the	
agreement	to	arbitrate.56	If	the	arbitration	agreement	is	governed	by	English	law,	





































































not	 apply	 to	determine	 the	 scope	of	 the	 separate	arbitration	agreement	—	 the	
arbitrator	may	therefore	have	a	freer	hand	to	assume	jurisdiction	than	a	court	in	
the	 same	 factual	 circumstances.66	In	 contrast,	 the	 substantive	 law	 applying	 to	






















—	 including	 the	 quasi-procedural	 issues	 —	 and	 the	 determination	 of	 the	





The	 Rome	 II	 Regulation	 applies	 to	 all	 courts	 or	 tribunals:68 	does	 this	 include	
arbitral	 tribunals?	 	 This	 proposition	 has	 been	 doubted	 on	 simple	 linguistic	
grounds.69	The	designation	‘arbitral	tribunal’	is	not	universal	in	all	EU	languages	
and	appears	to	be	a	matter	of	convention	in	English.		Moreover,	we	have	seen	that	
arbitrators	 are	 not	 ‘courts	 or	 tribunals’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 TFEU	 —	in	
particular	Article	267	—	as	they	are	not	able	to	make	references	for	interpretation	
of	EU	law	directly	to	the	CJEU	as	EU	courts	may.70		Since	the	CJEU	has	competence	
to	 give	 rulings	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Rome	 II	 Regulation,71	it	 would	 be	
inconsistent	to	include	arbitrators	in	the	definition	of	courts	or	tribunals	able	to	






Member	 States. 72 		 For	 this	 express	 ‘carve	 out’	 to	 apply,	 the	 international	
obligations	 in	 question	 have	 to	 be	 notified	 to	 the	 EU	 Commission. 73 		 The	
notifications	do	not,	however,	include	the	New	York	Convention,74	so	the	express	
‘without	 prejudice’	 exception	 will	 not	 apply	 to	 allow	 international	 arbitration	
procedures	to	override	the	Rome	II	Regulation.		Nevertheless,	Article	351	TFEU	
provides	for	a	general	‘override’	for	pre-existing	international	Treaties	to	which	





















dispute.	 	Although	 there	must	be	 significant	doubt	—	as	 indicated	by	Advocate	
General	Wathelet	 in	Gazprom76	—	that	 EU	 conflict	 of	 law	 rules	 are	 sufficiently	
fundamental	 to	constitute	an	ordre	public	 exception	 for	 the	purposes	of	Article	










The	general	 rule	 in	 the	Rome	 II	Regulation	 is	 that	 the	 law	applicable	 to	a	non-
contractual	dispute	is	that	of	the	country	in	which	the	damage	occurs,	although	
this	 default	 principle	 can	 be	 displaced	 if	 there	 is	 another	 law	 which	 has	 a	
“manifestly”	closer	connection	to	the	obligation.77		This	may	occur,	in	particular,	












law	claims	are	among	those	 to	have	 their	own	regime.81		Because	of	 the	strong	
possibility	that	a	number	of	different	laws	would	apply	to	non-contractual	claims	
against	cartels	(in	particular),	Article	6(3)(b)	of	the	Rome	II	Regulation	provides:	





















relevant	 to	 the	procedure	 to	be	used	 in	 the	collective	arbitration?	 	The	Rome	II	
Regulation,	despite	only	applying	to	the	substance,	requires	certain	issues	which	
have	 a	 significant	 procedural	 impact	 (our	 ‘quasi-procedural’	 matters)	 to	 be	



















































Furthermore,	 although	Article	6	 severely	 limits	 the	 ability	 of	 the	parties	 to	 the	
dispute	to	 choose	 the	 law	 of	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate,	 it	 does	 not	 similarly	
constrain	the	power	of	the	arbitrator	to	decide	on	the	appropriate	law.		Even	on	
















Article	 6	 competition	 exception.	 	 This	 will	 be	 particularly	 important	 where	
inflexible	application	of	the	competition	exception	might	mean	that	more	than	one	




The	 Regulation’s	 ‘general	 rule’	 —	and	 in	 particular	 the	 ‘manifestly	 closer	
connection’	escape	valve	contained	in	it93		—	is	likely	to	describe	the	method	used	
by	 any	 sensible	 arbitrator	 to	 determine	 the	 law	 of	 the	 obligation,	 even	 in	 the	
absence	of	any	special	EU	choice	of	rules	indicating	how	this	should	be	done.94	In	
practice,	therefore,	situations	where	an	arbitrator	is	compelled	to	use	a	different	








determining	 the	 law	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 and	 therefore	 any	 relevant	














Questions	 of	 fact	 as	 to	 the	 place	 of	 harm	 may	 themselves	 require	 significant	
evidence	 —	 particularly	 in	 cases	 which	 do	 not	 follow-on	 from	 a	 competition	
authority	decision.	A	prima	facie	reasoning	should	be	sufficient	at	this	early	stage	
of	the	arbitration	procedure,	but	will	need	to	be	shown	in	the	award	to	avoid	the	
risk	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 law	 —	 and	 (potentially)	 findings	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 the	




of	 (substantive)	 law	 in	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 Rome	 II	 Regulation	 —	parties	 should	
nevertheless	continue	to	choose	a	law	to	apply	to	their	arbitration	agreement	in	
competition	cases.	This	choice	may	not	override	‘quasi-procedural’	requirements	
in	 the	 law	 applied	 by	 operation	 of	 the	 Rome	 II	 Regulation	 to	 the	 substantive	
obligation.		However,	the	arbitrator	should	nevertheless	be	invited	to	take	their	





desired	seat	of	arbitration	and	 its	 law	 to	govern	 their	arbitration	agreement,	 is	







law	 applying	 to	 the	 procedure	 for	 arbitrating	 a	 non-contractual	 competition	



























will	 then	need	 to	decide	 if	 the	 collective	 treatment	 of	 the	 claims	before	him	 is	
appropriate.	 	 The	usual	 factors	 considered	outside	Europe	 for	 a	 litigated	 ‘class	
action’	 or	 similar	 claims	 are	 (broadly)	 the	 number	 of	 class	 members	 (or	
‘numerosity’),	‘commonality’	of	the	issues	to	be	decided,	‘superiority’	of	using	the	












































consent	 from	 each	 member	 of	 the	 group	 who	 is	 being	 represented	 to	 the	
representative	—	even	if	only	on	a	membership	application	form	—	and	the	extent	
of	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 group	 members	 can	 be	 verified.	 Such	 representative	
proceedings	 would	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 in	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 that	
submission	 to	 arbitration	 be	 by	 agreement	 in	 writing.104 		 	 The	 parties	 to	 the	






power	 to	 arbitrate.	 The	 arbitration	would	 therefore	 not,	 at	 that	 point,	 include	
group	 members	 who	 have	 not	 yet	 expressly	 consented	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
particular	 collective	 arbitration	 proceedings	 under	 review,	 using	 the	
representative	claimant	appearing	before	the	court.105		Under	national	arbitration	





of	 the	 position	 of	 potential	 group	members	 when	 considering	 the	 numerosity	
criterion.	First,	a	proposed	collective	arbitration	may	clearly	affect	the	position	of	
persons	capable	of	consenting	to	participate	in	the	arbitration,	even	if	they	have	
not	yet	done	so.	 	For	example,	 findings	 in	an	arbitration	brought	by	a	group	of	
residents	in	EU	Member	State	A	may	well	have	a	de	facto	effect	on	the	position	of	
similarly	 situated	 victims	 in	Member	 State	 B	who	 are	 not	 represented	 but	 fall	
within	the	(material)	scope	of	the	proposed	class	affected.			
	
Second,	 an	 award	 or	 refusal	 to	 award	 compensation	 to	 a	 group	 of	 direct	
purchasers	 from	 (for	 example)	 a	 cartel	 may	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 position	 of	
indirect	 purchasers	who	 bought	 cartel	 products	 from	 those	 direct	 purchasers.		
They	are	‘concerned’	by	the	outcome	of	the	arbitration	but	not	within	the	existing	

















the	 group	 into	 account	 when	 deciding	 whether	 to	 proceed	 with	 a	 collective	
arbitration	of	the	dispute.107		The	fact	that	claimants	who	could	do	so	have	not	yet	




of	 their	 positions	 if	 the	 risk	 of	 successful	 challenge	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	
(collective)	award	is	to	be	minimised.		How	far	the	arbitrator	should	take	account	
of	potential	parties	may	also	depend	on	the	public	policy	in	the	law	governing	the	
arbitration	 procedure	 —	 primarily	 (as	 we	 have	 seen)	 the	 lex	 arbitri. 108 	For	
example,	German	collective	redress	legislation	recognizes	the	(non-party)	status	
of	 “concerned	 others”	 (Beigeladenen)	 who	 have	 claims	 which	 ‘depend’	 on	 the	
collective	claim.109		
	
In	 short,	 application	 of	 the	 numerosity	 requirement	 in	 considering	 the	
admissibility	 of	 a	 collective	 arbitration	 procedure	 should	 address	 not	 only	 the	
number	 of	 persons	 actually	 represented	 at	 the	 time	 the	 decision	 to	 order	 a	
collective	arbitration	 is	 taken,	but	also	those	who	are	potential	members	of	 the	
represented	group.	The	number	of	 “concerned	others”	whose	 interests	may	be	










A	 first	 point	 of	 reference	may	 be	 any	 provisions	 in	 the	 law	 of	 the	 arbitration	
agreement	or	the	civil	procedure	rules	of	the	lex	arbitri	—	is	there	a	test	there	for	
the	degree	of	 connection	between	 the	 claims	 advanced	by	 the	members	of	 the	

































• ‘veroorzaakt	 door	 een	 gebeurtenis	 of	 gelijksoortige	 gebeurtenissen’,	
















KapMuG) 114 	whereas	 the	 most	 restrictive	 may	 apply	 to	 procedures	 which	
automatically	include	all	members	of	the	group	without	the	possibility	of	an	‘opt-
out’	 (English	 representative	 action).115	It	 is	 also	 noticeable	 that	 non-European	

















be	 the	 ‘same	or	 similar’.	 	 Some	of	 the	 tests	 add	 a	more	permissive	 ‘or	 related’	
element,	 but	 this	 appears	 far	 from	 universal.	 	 This	 difference	may	 not	 appear	
significant	but,	in	claims	for	competition	damages,	it	may	be	of	some	importance.		





















but	would	 also	 reduce	 the	 possibility	 of	 conflicts	 arising	within	 the	 class	 after	































(with	 individual	 issues	 outweighing	 them),	 collective	 treatment	 may	 not	 be	
appropriate.			
	
It	has	been	suggested	 that	 three	 issues	have	normally	been	addressed	 in	(non-
European)	class	jurisdictions:121	
















































the	 scope	 of	 a	 valid	 arbitration	 agreement	 to	 arbitration. 124 		 This	 is	 also	 the	
position	under	arbitration	 legislation	 in	EU	Member	States.125		Those	claimants	
who	have	(directly	or	indirectly)	already	consented	to	arbitration	at	the	time	the	








to	 the	 particular	 collective	 arbitration,	 the	 possibility	 that	 they	 will	 prefer	 to	
arbitrate	individually	—	or	(if	they	have	yet	to	consent	to	arbitration	at	all)	litigate	










claimants	 in	the	arbitration	able	to	 litigate	collectively	 in	a	specific	 jurisdiction,	
















part	 of	 the	 group	 of	 potential	 claimants	 is	 domiciled	 in	 a	 country	which	 has	 a	
significantly	more	advanced	litigated	collective	procedure	regime	than	that	which	
could	be	adopted	by	the	arbitrator	consistent	with	the	arbitration	agreement	and	







there	 are	 a	 large	 number	 of	 actual	 claimants	 —	 or,	 even	 though	 the	 actual	
claimants	are	few,	a	significant	number	of	potential	claimants	—	a	representative	
model	is	likely	to	give	more	effective	redress	to	the	claimant	class	and	a	greater	
degree	of	 finality	 to	 the	defendants,	 as	well	 as	 being	more	manageable	 for	 the	
arbitrator.	
	
What	criteria	 should	be	applied	by	an	arbitrator	 to	select	a	 representative	and	
what	process	should	be	used	to	apply	the	criteria?	
	
Potential	 representatives	 can	 be	 broadly	 divided	 into	 two	 categories:	 either	
persons	who	have	a	prima	facie	claim	against	the	infringers	—	a	class	member	—	
or	 bodies	 which	 represent	 their	 members	 (for	 example,	 trade	 or	 consumer	
associations)	who	in	turn	form	all	or	part	of	the	class	which	has	suffered	harm.		
The	use	of	class	members	as	representatives	is	the	‘traditional’	position	in	(non-
European)	 class	 action	 jurisdictions.127		 In	 contrast	 the	 use	 of	 a	 representative	





In	Schrems,	 the	 CJEU	 considered	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 general	 principle	 of	
effectiveness	to	a	representative	consumer	claim	in	Austria	for	breach	of	EU	data	
protection	 legislation. 129 		 The	 CJEU	 was	 asked	 whether	 an	 ad	 hoc	 Austrian	




















association)	 is	 not	 a	 bar	 —	at	 least	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 EU	 public	 policy	 —	to	 it	
representing	any	type	of	claimant.	However,	those	(such	as	consumers)	to	whom	
EU	 law	affords	enhanced	protection	against	being	sued	abroad	would	 lose	 that	
additional	 protection	 by	 participating	 in	 a	 collective	 claim.	 The	 representative	
litigation	claims	might	still	be	able	to	go	forward	under	the	general	(but	not	the	
consumer	specific)	conflict	of	law	rules	—	even	though	this	might	mean	that	the	
(here	 Austrian)	 courts	 would	 have	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 over	 some	 of	 their	





The	 criteria	 to	 be	 applied	 to	 all	 representatives	 should	 address	 the	 following	
questions:	
• is	 the	 proposed	 representative	 able	 properly	 to	 represent	 the	 common	
interests	of	the	whole	class?		In	particular	there	should	be	no	conflicts	of	
interest	between	the	representative	and	any	class	members;134	








• is	 the	representative	a	profit	making	body	or	set	up	 for	 the	purposes	of	
conducting	 the	 collective	 proceedings	 or	 is	 it,	 in	 contrast	 a	 non-profit	
organization	 with	 a	 significant	 track	 record?	 	 The	 Commission	
recommends	a	non-profit	entity;	
• how	close	are	the	objects	or	previous	activities	of	the	body	to	the	dispute	
giving	 rise	 to	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 class?	 The	 Commission	 recommends	 a	
‘direct’	relationship	between	them;	
• has	 the	body	been	 recognised	as	having	 capacity	 to	 litigate	on	behalf	of	
groups	by	national	authorities?	 	The	Commission	prefers	this,	but	leaves	

























be	 allowed	 to	 continue	 to	 represent	 the	 group	 which	 he	 has	 asserted	 he	






the	 outset	 of	 the	 case	 in	 an	 admissibility	 or	 ‘certification’	 decision	 (either	 an	
interim	 admissibility	 award	 or,	 less	 likely,	 a	 ‘peremptory	 order’).	 	 This	 is	 the	






may	be	made	 to	set	 it	aside	 in	 the	event	of	 ‘serious	 irregularity’	 (or	equivalent	
grounds)	in	the	collective	procedure	admitted	by	the	arbitrator.141	
	




representative	 (“ideological	 claimant”)	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 criteria	 in	 the	
Commission	Recommendation.	We	will	 consider	 these	 issues	 under	 two	broad	



















the	 definition	 of	 the	 class	 represented?	 	 This	 is	 essential	 if	 the	 arbitrator	 is	 to	
ascertain	if	the	representative	represents	all	of	the	class	members.		Second,	do	the	
claims	advanced	by	the	representative	properly	and	fairly	cover	all	of	the	common	






is	 agreed,	 it	will	 nevertheless	be	 important	 for	 the	arbitrator	 to	 reach	his	own	
conclusions	and	to	record	them	in	an	award.		In	particular	this	should	avoid	the	
possibility	of	the	‘agreed’	class	definition	being	viewed	as	part	of	an	arbitration	
designed	 to	 avoid	 the	 full	 effects	 of	 the	 requirement	 on	 the	 defendant(s)	 to	
compensate	for	an	EU	competition	infringement.143	
	
The	 arbitrator	will	 also	need	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 group	definition	 is	 sufficiently	
clear	to	enable	any	potential	claimant	to	be	able	tell	whether	they	are	in	or	outside	
the	represented	group.	We	suggest	that	this	‘clarity’	test	needs	to	be	met	from	the	
time	 the	 arbitrator	 is	 asked	 to	 make	 a	 decision	 on	 the	 commencement	 (or	
continuance)	 of	 collective	 proceedings	 and	 should	 be	 reviewed	 if	 the	 group	
definition	changes.	144	
	
But	perhaps	 the	most	 important	 requirement	of	 a	 class	definition	 is	 that	 there	













sub-classes	 so	 that	 the	 issues	 on	 which	 there	 are	 conflicts	 can	 be	 dealt	 with	
















body	 from	 representing	 all	 sub-classes	 in	 the	 overall	 arbitration	 of	 a	 series	 of	
related	collective	claims.		The	representative	does	not	himself	have	an	interest	in	
any	claim.		Clearly,	in	an	exceptional	case,	where	the	interests	of	two	sub-classes	




And,	 even	 if	 ‘sub-classing’	 is	 possible,	 it	may	 be	 necessary	 for	 the	 ‘ideological’	









But	 how	 should	 an	 arbitrator	 decide	 if	 a	 body	 he	 is	 asked	 to	 approve	 has	 the	







the	 type	 of	 dispute	which	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 collective	 claim.147		 The	 body	
should	 also	 have	 sufficient	 expertise	 and	 financial	 resources	 to	 represent	 the	
whole	 group	 in	 a	 claim	 of	 the	 kind	 being	 brought. 148 		 These	 criteria	 appear	
uncontroversial.149	
	
In	 a	 further	 recommendation,	 the	 Commission	 proposes	 that	 a	 representative	
body	should	be	state	designated	before	it	can	be	a	representative	in	a	collective	
action.		Nevertheless,	we	suggest	that	this	should	not	prevent	the	arbitrator	from	
deciding	 that	 an	 undesignated	 body	 is	 suitable	 to	 represent	 the	 class.	 	 An	
arbitrator	 is	 not	 bound	 by	 the	 detailed	 procedural	 requirements	 of	 the	 lex	
arbitri. 150 		 Moreover,	 the	 Recommendation	 also	 envisages	 that	 representative	









considering	 the	 suitability	 of	 an	 ideological	 representative	body,	 the	 arbitrator	
will	 need	 to	 address	 each	 of	 the	 other	 criteria	 for	 designation	 set	 out	 in	 the	
















set	 up	 to	 conduct	 collective	 claims,	 the	 CAT	 will	 examine	 the	 details	 of	 the	
management	 and	 constitution	 of	 the	 proposed	 representative	 and	 may	 take	
evidence	from	the	managers.158	
	
Reflecting	 the	 Commission	 Recommendation,	 the	 Rules	 also	 indicate	 that	 the	
representative	body	must	have	sufficient	 financial	 resources	 to	meet	any	 likely	
costs	order	made	against	it	on	behalf	of	the	claimant	group.159	It	should	also	have	
prepared	a	plan	for	conducting	the	collective	competition	claim,	including:	








should	 require	 the	 representative	 to	 produce	 both	 evidence	 of	 its	 objects	 and	




















set	 out	 in	 the	 CAT	 Rules	 	 will	 demonstrate	 application	 of	 the	 criteria	 in	 the	





class	 —	 ideological	 representation	 is	 rarer. 161 		 There	 is	 little	 extra-judicial	



















set	 out	 in	 Article	 V	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention,	which	 are	 exhaustive.165	Our	
review	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 the	 main	 procedural	 issues	 affecting	 the	
recognition	of	interim	awards	on	a	setting	aside	application	will	also	be	relevant	
to	 a	 setting	 aside	 application	 against	 the	 final	 collective	 competition	 award	on	








involved	for	the	claimants	in	the	action;	Wexler	v	AT&T	Corporation	15-CV-0686 (FB) (PK) 
























section	 (in	 3.3),	 we	 will	 consider	 how	 challenges	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 inadequate	
notification	may	be	mitigated	—	and	in	particular	the	extent	to	which	the	parties	








marked	 ‘pro-arbitration’	 stance	 —	 particularly	 at	 the	 stage	 of	 enforcing	
arbitration	 awards	 already	made.170		 For	 example,	 the	UK	Arbitration	Act	 only	
permits	enforcement	challenges	based	on	the	conduct	of	the	proceedings	leading	
to	 the	 award	where	 the	 arbitrator	 did	 not	 conduct	 them	 in	 accordance	with	 a	
procedure	agreed	by	the	parties	or	where	there	is	an	admitted	irregularity	in	the	

























arbitrator	 to	 do	 so.174	French	 legislation	 similarly	 only	 allows	 challenges	 to	 an	
international	arbitration	award	in	case	of	‘flagrant’	irregularity.	175	
	
Where	 EU	 competition	 rights	 have	 been	 arbitrated,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 the	
arbitrator	will	need	to	ensure	that	EU	law	general	principles	are	observed	if	the	
award	is	to	be	enforceable	in	EU	Member	States.176	National	courts	are	required	





The	 CJEU	 has	 been	 asked	 to	 consider	 the	 question	 of	 how	 far	 EU	 law	 should	
intervene	to	regulate	court	control	of	arbitrations	on	a	number	of	occasions.178		
The	judgments	of	the	Court	show	a	considerable	reluctance	to	interfere	too	greatly	














































The	 CJEU	 reinforced	 this	 ‘light	 touch’	 message	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 EcoSwiss	
judgment:	
….it	 is	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 efficient	 arbitration	 proceedings	 that	 review	 of	







































review	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 sole	 arbitrator	 or	 his	 interpretation	 of	 the	 licence	
agreement	carried	out	in	the	light	of	[national]	law…”190	
	
Where	 does	 this	 decision	 leave	 CJEU’s	 practice	 on	 the	 level	 of	 scrutiny	 of	
arbitration	awards	by	national	 courts?	 	 It	 appears	 that	 the	French	courts	 (and,	
therefore	 any	 other	 national	 courts	 operating	 under	 comparable	 national	
legislation)	 cannot	 be	 required	 by	 EU	 law	 to	 look	 behind	 the	 substance	 of	 the	







compliance	with	EU	general	 principles.	 	And,	 following	 the	EcoSwiss	 judgment,	
that	 review	must	 be	 as	 detailed	 as	 the	 national	 court	 thinks	 is	 needed	 in	 the	
circumstances.191			
	
So	 the	 ‘light	 touch’	 scrutiny	 of	 awards,	 provided	 in	 most	 national	 arbitration	
legislation	in	EU	Member	States,	is	not	dead.		However	—	and	despite	ignoring	AG	
Wathelet’s	views	in	Genentech	on	the	inapplicability	of	the	‘flagrant	breach’	and	
‘no	 substantive	 review’	 requirements	 in	 French	 law	—	 if	 the	 CJEU	 is	 asked	 to	
































—	 fairly	 self-evident	—	principles	when	 setting	 the	 collective	 procedure	 to	 be	





persuasive.	 	 Arbitration	 —	and	 therefore	 court	 judgments	 in	 support	 of	










































Advocate	 General	 Wathelet	 in	 contrast	 did	 give	 an	 opinion	 on	 this	 point.	 He	
considered	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 ‘public	 policy’	 (ordre	 public)	 in	 an	
international	 private	 law	 context	 when	 enforcing	 arbitration	 awards. 201 		 He	









EU	 ‘public	policy’.204		He	concluded	that	 the	CJEU	has	yet	 to	set	out	 the	criteria	
against	 which	 a	 provision	 of	 EU	 law	 should	 be	 assessed	 to	 be	 considered	
‘fundamental’,	but	he	considered	that	they	must	be	the		
…	 body	 of	 principles	 that	 form	 part	 of	 the	 very	 foundations	 of	 the	 [EU]	 legal	
order.205	
	














































How	 then	 should	 an	 arbitrator	—	and	 the	parties	—	approach	 the	question	of	









































the	 parties	 in	 the	 arbitration	 agreement.	 	 For	 (post-dispute)	 submission	
agreements,	 they	 should	 therefore	 be	 dealt	 with	 expressly.	 	 For	 pre-dispute	
arbitration	clauses,	there	is	a	low	possibility	that	the	parties	will	have	expressly	




AAA	 and	 the	 DIS	 supplementary	 rules	 have	 express	 provision	 to	 reverse	 the	
presumption	 of	 confidentiality. 217 	But	 neither	 of	 them	 fully	 apply	 unless	 the	
parties	 have	 separately	 expressly	 consented	 to	 arbitration	 under	 the	 relevant	
supplementary	rules.			
	








could	 potentially	 consent	 to	 the	 arbitration.218 	But	 it	 will	 only	 be	 enforceable	
against	those	who	have	in	fact	been	able	to	participate.219		As	against	this,	there	is	
an	 implied	 presumption	 that	 arbitrations	 are	 confidential. 220 		 Creating	 a	
notification	 regime	which	 satisfies	 a	 ‘fairness’	 of	 notice	 test,	 striking	 the	 right	
balance	between	a	wide	scope	(and	therefore	enforceability)	of	the	award	and	an	




















the	competence	given	 to	 them	by	 the	parties.221		The	European	Court	of	





directly	 applicable	 EU	 law	 rights. 224 		 It	 must	 not	 ‘render	 excessively	
difficult	 nor	 virtually	 impossible’	 the	 assertion	 of	 those	 rights.	 So,	 the	
notification	 system	 chosen	 must	 not	 be	 too	 onerous	 either	 for	 the	
representative	or,	importantly,	for	the	members	of	the	group;	
• assuming	(direct	or	indirect)	consent	to	collective	arbitration,	the	‘opt-in’	
principle	 normally	 applying	 to	 EU	 collective	 claims	 will	 not	 prevent	

















not	 only	 the	 current	 claimants	 in	 the	 group	 but	 any	 known	 potential	
claimants.		For	example,	notices	may	need	to	be	in	a	number	of	different	EU	
languages	to	be	fully	effective.		It	will	be	important	for	future	enforcement	
for	 notices	 to	 set	 out	 clearly	 and	 precisely	 to	 whom	 (which	 types	 of	
claimant)	they	are	directed;	
• given	 probable	 implied	 confidentiality	 of	 arbitration	 proceedings,	 the	
defendants	 will	 need	 to	 have	 expressly	 or	 impliedly	 waived	 any	
confidentiality	objection	for	the	purposes	of	adequate	notification.	Where	
this	 waiver	 is	 implied	 by	 the	 arbitrator	 in	 his	 admissibility	 award,	





























The	 DIS	 supplementary	 rules	 for	 collective	 claims	 brought	 under	 the	 German	
KapMuG	require	that	those	who	have	consented	to	arbitration	shall	be	given	the	
opportunity	to	join	the	arbitration	from	the	outset.230			The	arbitration	claim	is	to	
be	 served	—	 in	 sufficient	 copies	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 be	 forwarded	 to	 all	 (known)	
‘concerned	others’	(potential	claimants)	—	with	a	deadline	(of	30	days)	for	them	
to	adhere	to	the	new	claim	and	become	parties.231	Those	potential	claimants	who	
have	not	 joined	as	parties	within	 this	 time	at	 the	outset	may	do	so	 later	 in	 the	
proceedings	—	but	only	on	the	basis	that	they	waive	their	right	to	object	to	any	
previous	step	in	the	arbitration	procedure.232		For	this	reason,	the	supplementary	
rules	 require	 ongoing	 notification	 of	 potential	 claimants,	 but	 the	 information	
which	has	to	be	supplied	to	them	is	limited.		Orders	and	decisions	of	the	arbitrator	
must	be	provided,	but	otherwise	notification	is	only	required		




notification	 requirements	 will	 differ	 according	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 participation	
(proximity)	 of	 (potential)	 claimants	 to	 the	 arbitration.	 	 But	 they	 also	 clearly	
establish	that	interested	persons	who	may	possibly	never	join	the	arbitration	as	
parties	 nevertheless	 need	 to	 be	 kept	 notified	 of	 the	 principal	 steps	 in	 the	
arbitration	proceedings.	
	













regime	 in	 England	 requires	 notice	 to	 be	 given	—	 to	 all	 class	members	—	 at	 a	
minimum	at	the	following	stages	of	the	action:235	
• when	a	collective	proceedings	order	is	made	(the	‘class’	is	‘certified’);	









sending	copies	of	 the	order	made	by	(or	notice	 filed	with)	 the	CAT	to	 the	class	
members.237	Other	notices	to	the	whole	class	are	not	mandatory,	although	the	CAT	
has	a	reserve	power	to	order	notice	to	be	given.238		 Importantly,	 the	CAT	Rules	









































demonstrate	 the	 causal	 link	 between	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 —	
particularly	 if	 it	 is	 ‘pre-dispute’	 —	 and	 the	 breach	 of	 (competition)	
obligation	complained	of.	
	




choice	of	 law	 legislation	normally	permits	discretion	 in	 the	arbitrator	 to	
find	 an	 applicable	 substantive	 law	 in	 one	 of	 the	 countries	 where	 the	




of	 ‘quasi-procedural’	 questions	 which	 are	 important	 for	 collective	




4. To	 ensure	 a	 single	 legal	 system	 applies	 to	 all	 procedural	 (and	 quasi-

















6. When	 carrying	 out	 the	 admissibility	 assessment,	 the	 arbitrator	 should	
consider	 groups	 of	 claimants	 with	 the	 ‘same	 or	 similar’	 claims.	 This	
(relatively)	 limited	scope	to	collective	arbitration	should	ensure	that	the	
final	 collective	 award	 achieves	maximum	 recognition	 and	 enforceability	
across	 the	 EU.	 ‘Related’	 claims	 may	 need	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 a	 separate	
	 136	




most	 appropriate	 in	 the	 circumstances.	 Where	 he	 decides	 to	 use	 a	
‘representative’	 procedure,	 he	 must	 also	 decide	 if	 the	 proposed	
representative	is	able	properly	to	sustain	the	representation	of	the	whole	
proposed	class	 throughout	 the	proceedings.	 	 In	doing	so	he	should	have	



















to	 the	 court	 to	 re-try	 the	 arbitrator’s	 factual	 findings.	 A	 judicial	 public	
policy	 review	of	 the	 exercise	of	 the	 arbitrator’s	procedural	 discretion	 to	





10. The	 proper	 remedy	 for	 a	 successful	 application	 to	 set	 aside	 an	 interim	
































































For	 competition	 arbitrations	—	most	 likely	 to	 be	 non-contractual	 in	 substance	
—	the	interplay	of	the	three	relevant	 legal	systems,	and	the	public	policy	 limits	






competition	 arbitration	—	and	 the	 arbitrator	—	 to	 aim	 for	 a	 single	 law	 as	 the	
substantive	law	governing	the	dispute,	as	the	law	of	the	arbitration	agreement	and	
as	 the	 lex	 arbitri.	 	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	 parties	 are	 unable	 to	 choose	 the	
substantive	 law	 to	 govern	 a	 non-contractual	 obligation	 to	 compensate	 arising	

















wide	 choice	 of	 available	 substantive	 laws	 in	 most	 collective	 competition	
arbitrations,	which	often	have	widely	dispersed	effects.3		But	he	will	need	to	select	
one	 with	 which	 the	 obligation	 in	 dispute	 has	 a	 ‘manifestly’	 close	 connection.4		
Although	the	parties’	choice	of	the	law	of	the	arbitration	agreement	—	or	of	the	







This	will	 imply	 the	 choice	of	 lex	arbitri	—	 the	principal	 legal	 and	public	policy	
framework	for	the	arbitration	procedure.	 	Choice	of	an	appropriate	seat	for	the	
arbitration	—	alongside	choice	of	appropriate	arbitration	institution	rules	—	will	
therefore	 be	 the	main	method	 for	 the	 parties	 to	 ensure	 a	 coherent	 procedural	
‘policy’	background	which	is	favourable	to	collective	competition	arbitration.		Our	
consideration	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 seat	 in	 this	 chapter	will	 look	 at	 the	 three	main	
contentious	areas	of	admissibility	for	collective	arbitration	procedure:	
• to	what	extent	are	‘opt-out’	representative	actions	likely	to	be	permitted?	
• when	 can	 consolidation	 rules	 be	 used	 to	 admit	 a	 group	 (non-
representative)	collective	procedure?	
• how	 far	 can	 a	 collective	 anti-trust	 award	 made	 outside	 Europe	 be	
recognised	and	enforced	in	the	EU?	
	
Although	 EU	 law	 —	 through	 its	 general	 principles	 and	 recent	 institutional	
additions	 to	 the	 acquis	 communautaire	—	 has	 brought	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	
‘levelling	 up’	 of	 public	 policy	 treatment	 of	 collective	 competition	 claims	 in	 EU	




to	 the	 systems	 of	 England	 and	 Germany	 —	as	 two	 of	 the	 most	 important	
economies	 (and	 sources	 of	 competition	 cases)	 in	 Europe,	 and	 both	 having	



















type	 of	 collective	 procedure.	 	 If	 the	 procedure	 admitted	 amounts	 to	 a	 ‘serious	
irregularity’	(to	use	the	English	legislative	formulation),	a	party	or	group	members	









Invoking	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 is	 a	 safety	 valve	 to	 be	 used	 in	 those	










will	 be	 determinative	 of	 the	 acceptability	 of	 advanced	 (‘opt-out’)	 forms	 of	














of	 the	 express	 consent	 of	 the	 parties	 is	 not	 ‘opt-in’.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	














England)	 as	 being	 brought	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 group	 described	 in	 the	 collective	
proceedings	order	except	those	who	expressly	choose	not	to	belong	to	it.13	
	











impliedly	 consented	 to	 collective	 arbitration.	 	 Separate	 express	 consent	 to	







But,	 as	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECtHR)	 found	 in	 Deweer, 16		
arbitration	may	be	compatible	with	Article	6	—	even	if	the	full	set	of	‘fair	process’	
guarantees	normally	provided	in	a	litigation	context	is	not	adhered	to	—	on	the	














‘Untainted’	 consent	 to	 an	 implied	waiver	 of	 procedural	 rights	 is,	 therefore,	 	 an	
acceptable	basis,	even	 for	 the	most	advanced	collective	competition	arbitration	



























redress	 in	 England,	 the	 Group	 Litigation	 Order	 (GLO) 19 	and	 the	 action	 for	
competition	‘collective	proceedings’.20		
	








internationally	 accepted	 practice	 relating	 to	 party	 autonomy.	 A	 collective	
competition	 award	 with	 English	 lex	 arbitri	 made	 using	 a	 collective	 procedure	
modelled	on	the	GLO,	would	clearly	not	be	open	to	challenge	on	arbitrability	or	
other	related	public	policy	grounds	in	the	English	courts.		And	a	foreign	collective	





BIT.23		 Although	 the	 GLO-type	 procedure	 may	 not	 be	 suitable	 for	 all	 kinds	 of	

















group	 register,	 a	 collective	 arbitration	 procedure	 modelled	 on	 the	 GLO	 will	




















A	 collective	 competition	 award	 in	 an	 arbitration	 seated	 in	 England,	 using	 a	
procedure	modeled	on	the	Competition	Act	‘opt-out’	procedure,	could	therefore	
not	 be	 set	 aside	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 ‘serious	 irregularity’	 (ie.	 on	 public	 policy	
grounds).27	Parliament	 has	 enacted	 a	 statute	 which	 expressly	 allows	 ‘opt-out’	




in	 accordance	with	 the	procedure	admitted	by	 the	arbitrator.	 	But,	 as	we	have	
discussed,	 even	 those	 class	 members	 in	 the	 ‘middle’	 —	consenting	 to	 that	




as	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 his	 own	 jurisdiction:	 court	 control	 of	 the	 jurisdictional	
‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’	 power	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 purely	 public	 policy	
considerations.29	Nevertheless,	the	questions	‘have	these	claimants	consented	to	
collective	 arbitration?’	 and	 ‘who	 exactly	 does	 the	 representative	 in	 fact	










jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility. 30 		 	 The	 English	 courts	 follow	 the	 ‘light	 touch	
approach	 to	 intervention	 in	 arbitration. 31 		 England	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 potential	





The	 German	 legal	 system	 accords	 strong	 protection	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 party	
autonomy,	giving	 it	constitutional	status.32		Despite	this,	 the	German	legislature	
has	 enacted	 provisions	 outside	 the	 competition	 arena	 which	 include	 a	 strong	
element	 of	 representative	 procedure:	 Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz	
(KapMuG).	33	This	applies	to	damages	claims	by	groups	of	shareholders	alleging	
certain	types	of	abuse	in	relation	to	false	trading	in	private	company	shares	and	
similar	 securities.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 Bundestag	 passed	 legislation	 in	 mid-2018	






it	 easier	 for	 claimants	 to	 join	 the	 model	 case	 and	 also	 allow	 court	 approved	
settlement	of	all	claims	included	in	the	model	case	(Musterverfahren)	even	where	
not	all	group	members	agree.		The	requirement	in	the	German	statute	for	a	formal	




(Müsterkläger)	 lodges	a	claim	with	a	competent	court	which	—	 if	 it	admits	 the	
representative	claim	—	will	set	up	a	‘group	register’	for	the	model	case.	All	of	the	
other	known	securities	holders	(Beigeladenen)	potentially	affected	by	the	claim	—	
whose	 names	will	 normally	 appear	 on	 the	 relevant	 share	 register	—	must	 be	




[….] wirkt der Musterentscheid für und gegen alle Beteiligten des Musterverfahrens 
unabhängig davon, ob der Beteiligte alle im Musterverfahren festgestellten Tatsachen selbst 



















representative	 judgment	 was	 made	 (and	 who	 will	 therefore	 have	 had	 the	
opportunity	to	participate).		This	distinguishes	the	KapMuG	procedure	from	a	US	







that	 an	 ‘opt-out’	 representative	 (class)	 action	 binds	 all	 represented	 parties,	






on	 the	 European	 Commission	 collective	 redress	 Recommendation:	 qualified	









of	 procedure	 in	 competition	 arbitration.	 	 First,	 the	 limitation	 of	 the	 KapMuG	
procedure	 in	 court	 litigation	 to	 financial	 services	 (securities)	 claims	 could	 be	





It	appears	difficult	 to	maintain	that	an	arbitrator	sitting	 in	Germany,	 looking	to	
apply	 a	 collective	 redress	 procedure	modelled	 on	 the	 KapMuG	 to	 competition	
claims,	 could	 be	 said	 to	 offend	 ‘basic	 notions’	 of	 German	 public	 policy.41 	The	
Bundestag	has	expressly	permitted	this	kind	of	procedure	and	it	must	be	assumed	











In	 that	 case	 the	 Bundesgerichtshof	 dismissed	 an	 appeal	 against	 a	 judgment	
upholding	 a	 referral	 to	collective	 arbitration	under	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 the	
articles	of	a	German	private	 limited	company.	 	 It	upheld	the	arbitrability	of	 the	






of	 the	arbitration	 tribunal	—	or	have	consented	 to	 its	appointment	by	a	
neutral	third	party;	







parties	 to	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 (in	 that	 case,	 all	 of	 the	 shareholders)	 in	
respect	of	that	dispute.		However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	number	of	parties	to	
the	‘Arbitration	II’	claim	was	relatively	low	—	in	single	figures.		If	the	number	of	
parties	 to	 the	 arbitration	 is	 higher,	 it	may	 be	 that	 a	German	 supervising	 court	
would	take	a	strict	view	of	compliance	by	an	arbitrator	with	these	four	principles	
to	ensure	 that	 the	parties’	 fundamental	rights	are	upheld.	 	This	may	mean	that	










German	 legal	order).45		Although	developed	 in	 the	context	of	a	securities	claim,	
they	 can	 easily	 be	 transferred	 to	 other	 contexts	 of	 mass	 harm	 —	including	
competition	claims.		Effectively,	we	suggest,	they	express	the	general	‘due	process’	















that	 all	 interested	 parties	 have	 each	 been	 properly	 notified	 of	 the	
Musterverfahren.46		 This	will	 not	 always	 be	 possible	 for	 claims	 by	 a	 dispersed	
group	 of	 victims	 of	 an	 anti-competitive	 practice.	 	 The	 availability	 of	 ‘opt-out’	
arbitration	using	a	KapMuG	procedure	may	well	depend	on	whether	the	claimant	
group	is	made	up	of	direct	or	indirect	purchasers	of	products	in	relation	to	which	
the	 competition	 mass	 harm	 occurred.	 ‘KapMuG-based’	 collective	 arbitration	
proceedings	on	behalf	of	a	group	of	indirect	purchasers	from	an	infringer	of	EU	
competition	 law	 may	 be	 problematic,	 due	 to	 the	 practical	 impossibility	 of	
accurately	individually	identifying	every	claimant	at	the	outset	of	the	proceedings.			
	








three	 requirements	 in	 ‘Arbitration	 II’	 are	 addressed), 47 	a	 group	 of	 direct	
purchasers	will	be	bound	by	the	result	of	a	German-seated	collective	competition	
arbitration	even	if	they	do	not	themselves	intervene	in	the	arbitration	proceedings	







The	 alternative	 type	 of	 collective	 redress	 to	 a	 representative	 action	 is	 a	 group	
claim.	 	 In	 essence,	 this	 amounts	 to	 the	 joinder	 of	 parties	 or	 consolidation	 of	 a	
number	of	individual	cases	based	on	their	degree	of	connection,	but	without	the	
‘intermediation’	of	a	representative	claimant.48		Some	grouping	techniques	—	the	




















only	 prominent	 EU	 jurisdiction	 expressly	 to	 permit	 a	 court	 to	 do	 this	 is	 the	
Netherlands.50			
	



















Although	 the	 expert	 committee	 was	 content	 to	 allow	 the	 parties	 to	 agree	 to	
consolidation,	 it	 strongly	 suggested	 that	 appropriate	 drafting	 of	 arbitration	
agreements	or	of	arbitration	institution	rules	to	permit	consolidation	of	a	number	
of	pending	arbitration	was	 the	 correct	way	 forward.53		The	 last	 revision	of	 the	






the	 rules	 of	 an	 arbitration	 institution	 which	 allow	 an	 appointing	 authority	 to	
consolidate	a	number	of	related	arbitrations.		This	practice	is	far	from	universal.	
Notably,	 for	 example,	 the	 UNCITRAL	 arbitration	 rules	 do	 not	 deal	 with	




















in	 connection	with	 the	 same	 legal	 relationship	 and	 the	 court	 finds	 the	 arbitration	
agreements	to	be	compatible.’58	
	
Compared	 with	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 more	 advanced	 national	 civil	





group	 competition	 procedure	 relying	 on	 consolidation	 since	 all	 of	 the	 various	










‘…	 	 after	 consulting	 with	 the	 parties	 and	 any	 confirmed	 arbitrator	 in	 all	
proceedings,	 that	 the	new	case	shall	be	consolidated	with	 the	pending	arbitral	
proceedings’.64	
























The	 test	 which	 the	 Court 66 	must	 apply	 in	 deciding	 whether	 to	 consolidate	
arbitrations	between	non-identical	parties	 is	an	 ‘all	 the	circumstances’	 test	and	
the	 links	 between	 the	 parties	 and	 the	 state	 of	 progress	 of	 the	 arbitration	
proceedings	 to	 be	 consolidated	 are	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 	 This	
mechanism	looks	much	more	like	a	‘traditional’	consolidation	power	in	national	




the	 rules	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 Arbitration	 Institute	 also	 permit	 consolidation	 of	
arbitrations	even	where	not	all	of	the	parties	have	directly	consented	to	this.67	The	
consolidation	procedure	provided	 in	 the	rules	mirrors	 that	 in	Dutch	 legislation	
—	a	 third	 person	 must	 be	 appointed	 to	 decide	 if	 the	 arbitrations	 should	 be	
consolidated.	But	if	not	all	of	the	parties	agree	on	an	appointee,	the	Netherlands	




administration	 of	 justice	 renders	 it	 expedient	 to	 hear	 and	 determine	 them	
together	 to	 avoid	 the	 risk	 of	 irreconcilable	 decisions	 resulting	 from	 separate	
proceedings.69	
	
The	 German	 arbitration	 rules	 (DIS)	 go	 further	 still	 —	 but	 only	 in	 a	 set	 of	
supplementary	 collective	 proceedings	 rules.	70	It	 appears	 that	 these	 should	 be	
included	in	the	agreement	to	arbitrate	by	separate	express	consent	from	each	of	
the	 parties	 —	 the	 supplementary	 rules	 indicate	 that	 use	 of	 the	 general	 DIS	
Arbitration	 Rules	 does	 not	 imply	 incorporation	 of	 the	 supplementary	 rules.71	
Since	these	DIS	supplementary	collective	arbitration	rules	are	the	most	advanced	
of	their	kind	in	Europe,	they	repay	closer	attention.	 	However,	the	lessons	from	
them	may	not	be	universally	applicable,	 as	 they	are	 specifically	designed	 to	be	
used	 with	 the	 KapMuG	 (and	 closely	 follow	 the	 requirements	 set	 out	 the	






















in	 the	 arbitration.73		 So	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	 supplementary	DIS	 rules	—	having	
taken	a	view	on	the	policy	requirements	of	German	law	as	a	backdrop	to	collective	
arbitration	procedure	—	do	not	appear	to	embrace	wholeheartedly	the	view	of	






parties	 and	 concerned	 others	 and	 for	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 proceedings.		






there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 arbitration	 proceedings	 with	 a	 single	 subject	 matter	
requiring	to	be	resolved	together	in	one	arbitration,	the	first	filed	arbitration	will	
go	forward	and	subsequent	arbitrations	are	declared	‘inadmissible’.74		The	parties	







mandatory	 ‘inadmissibility’	 procedure	 is	 binding	 on	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 later	






If	 the	 DIS	 supplementary	 clause	 is	 not	 included,	 the	 generally	 applicable	 DIS	
Arbitration	Rules	do	contain	provision	for	consolidation	of	pending	arbitrations,	
but	only	with	the	consent	of	all	of	the	parties.76		However,	section	18	—	dealing	
with	 multiple	 claimants	 or	 defendants	 —	does	 give	 the	 arbitrator	 an	 express	






















by	 the	 UK	 arbitration	 legislation	 —	 is	 to	 only	 allow	 consolidation	 where	 the	







only	allow	 the	 ICC	Court	of	Arbitration	 to	 consolidate	arbitrations	 in	 relatively	
limited	 circumstances.	 Other	 rules	 take	 a	 broader	 approach	—	with	 the	 Swiss	
rules	being	the	most	liberal	(and	therefore	the	most	useful	for	creating	a	‘mass’	
action).		And	the	German	DIS	rules	allow	parties	to	consent	specifically	to	a	‘class	
action’	 supplement	—	but	only,	on	 its	 face,	 in	 shareholder	 claims	—	and	make	
provision	to	ensure	that	only	one	arbitration	is	carried	forward.	
	
The	widespread	 incorporation	of	 arbitration	 institution	 rules	 in	 agreements	 to	
arbitrate	should	mean	that	the	most	effective	way	of	facilitating	grouped	(‘mass’)	
collective	competition	arbitration	will	be	for	arbitration	institutions	to	adopt	rules	
addressing	 this	 phenomenon	 —	notably	 by	 modernising	 their	 rules	 on	
consolidation.			
	







EEA)	 state	where	 the	 infringement	 of	 EU	 competition	 law	 has	 had	 an	 effect.78		










Actions	 by	 groups	 wishing	 to	 claim	 compensation	 for	 competition	 (anti-trust)	
infringements	are	routinely	litigated	in	a	number	of	fora	and	in	some	—	notably	
the	 USA	 —	 are	 also	 arbitrated	 on	 a	 collective	 basis. 80 		 Where	 the	 collective	








Convention	 applies	 to	 arbitration	 awards	 (and	 thus	 to	 agreements	 to	 arbitrate	




Class	 ‘arbitration’	 awards	—	particularly	 in	 the	US	—	have	arisen	 in	 two	main	
ways.	 	 First,	 there	 are	 cases	 where	 the	 arbitrator	 —	relying	 on	 the	 parties’	
(implied)	consent	to	class	arbitration	—	himself	certifies	a	class	action,	as	in	the	
Stolt	 Nielsen	 case.	 	 He	 has	 therefore	 interpreted	 the	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 to	
include	class	arbitration	and	the	outcome	of	the	proceedings	is	an	award	which	





For	 class	 arbitration	 awards	 following	 the	 second	 type	 of	 procedure,	with	 the	
coercive	power	of	a	court	used	to	form	the	class,	there	must	be	a	serious	question	
as	to	whether	the	‘class’	element	of	the	dispute	resolution	is	properly	within	the	
scope	 of	 the	 parties’	 consent	 to	 arbitrate.	 	 The	 New	 York	 Convention	 permits	







the	substantive	 findings	 in	 the	award	under	 the	guise	of	a	consideration	of	 the	
arbitrator’s	 competence:	 the	 unenforceable	 ‘class’	 element	 should	 be	 severed	
from	the	substance	of	the	award.87	The	collective	award	would	therefore	remain	























would	 have	 been	 substantially	 different	 if	 his	 preferred	 procedure	 had	 been	
followed.92	
	
A	 court	 in	 Europe	 would	 therefore	 be	 able	 (and	 probably	 must)	 refuse	 to	
recognize	under	the	New	York	Convention	those	procedural	parts	of	an	‘award’	
which	 are	 ordered	 by	 a	 foreign	 court.	 In	 contrast,	where	 a	 collective	 award	 is	
based	on	an	initial	finding	by	the	arbitrator	that	the	arbitration	agreement	permits	
class	 arbitration	 and	 that	 finding	 is	 subsequently	 confirmed	 by	 a	 foreign	
supervisory	 court,	 the	 supervisory	 court’s	 later	 judgment	 does	 not	 alter	 the	
fundamentally	 consensual	 nature	 of	 the	 class	 award.	 	 It	 should	 therefore	 be	
enforceable	 in	 the	EU	as	 against	 all	 consenting	 class	members	unless	 it	 can	be	










EU,	 an	 EU	 enforcing	 court	must	 	 address	 the	 basic	 principles	we	 have	 already	
discovered:	
• recognition	and	enforcement	of	non-EU	arbitration	awards	by	a	national	


















• however,	 EU	 courts	 must	 —	 on	 a	 ‘second	 look’	 on	 an	 application	 for	
enforcement	of	an	arbitrator’s	award	—	ensure	compliance	with	EU	public	
































As	 a	 first	 indication,	 practice	 in	 Member	 States	 regarding	 the	 recognition	 of	
requests	to	recognise	US	litigated	class	action	judgments	varies	considerably.		For	
example,	 the	 Amsterdam	 District	 Court	 recognized	 a	 US	 ‘opt-out’	 class	 action	




















implementing	 the	 state’s	 international	 obligations	 under	 the	 New	 York	
Convention.	The	‘pro-arbitration’	stance	evident	from	the	New	York	Convention	








requires	 the	party	 to	 ‘opt-in’	 to	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 so	 that	many	of	 the	






notably	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Commission	 Recommendation)	 is	 that	 collective	




The	potential	 for	 fundamental	 policy	 differences	 regarding	 the	 admissibility	 in	
arbitration	of	a	collective	procedure	appears	—	perhaps	paradoxically	—	to	be	




















The	 criticisms	 of	 US	 anti-trust	 competition	 (anti-trust)	 class	 judgments	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 EU	 system	 of	 competition	 enforcement	 are	 well	 rehearsed	
elsewhere.107		As	a	general	‘rule	of	thumb’	the	EU	competition	law	prohibitions	on	
cartels	 and	 other	 pricing	 or	 market	 sharing	 agreements	 between	 competitors	
mirror	 those	 applied	 in	 all	 other	 jurisdictions	with	 developed	 competition	 law	
regimes.108		EU	competition	law	tends	to	be	more	intrusive	than	other	regimes	in	
relation	 to	 ‘vertical’	 agreements	 —	 for	 example	 between	 suppliers	 and	
distributors.	 	US	practice	 tends	 to	be	non-interventionist	here,109	while	EU	 law	
applies	 a	 set	 of	 relatively	 detailed	 rules	 depending	 on	 the	market	 share	 of	 the	








We	suggest	 that,	 if	an	arbitrator	outside	 the	EU	 finds	 that	 the	resolution	of	 the	
dispute	 necessarily	 leads	 to	 different	 substantive	 (competition	 law)	 outcomes,	
depending	on	whether	he	is	applying	the	non-European	substantive	anti-trust	law	
of	 the	 seat	or	EU	 competition	 rules,	 he	may	be	 required	—	if	he	 is	 to	make	an	
































These	 differences	 and	 difficulties	 should	 not	 be	 overstated,	 however.	 	 The	
majority	of	trans-Atlantic	competition	law	cases	litigated	to	date	have	been	cartel	
infringements:	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 substantive	 competition	 law	 treatment	 of	
cartels	in	the	EU	and	the	US	are	minimal.		In	trans-Atlantic	cartel	cases	it	should	
always	 be	 possible	 for	 a	 competent	 arbitrator	 to	 reach	 a	 reasoned	 award	




looks	 set	 to	 change	 further. 113 		 Very	 few	 judges	 in	 European	 fora	 can	 now	





















likely	 prefer	 that	 all	 three	 of	 the	 laws	 applying	 to	 the	 arbitration	
(substantive	 law,	 law	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement,	 lex	 arbitri)	 are	 the	
same,	 or	 at	 least	 fully	 consistent	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 public	 policy	
boundaries	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	 discretion	 to	 admit	 advanced	 collective	
redress	procedures	should	then	be	coherently	applicable;	
	
4. The	consequent	 importance	of	 the	seat	of	arbitration	(and	 lex	arbitri)	 in	
determining	the	procedural	framework	within	which	the	arbitrator	must	
exercise	 his	 discretion	 means	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 seat	 with	 developed	
collective	 litigation	 rules	 is	 advisable	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 successful	





Netherlands	 and	Germany	are	 those	EU	Member	 States	which	 currently	
have	the	most	advanced	collective	proceedings	rules	in	the	EU;114	
	
5. Supervising	 courts	 in	 other	 European	 countries	 with	 less	 developed	
collective	redress	procedures	—	France,	for	example	—	may	nevertheless	





from	 all	 parties	 to	 consolidate	 arbitrations	 already	 commenced	 will	 be	
required	 under	most	 national	 arbitration	 legislation.	 	 This	 consent	 can,	
however,	 be	 given	 indirectly	 by	 incorporating	 the	 rules	 of	 arbitration	













place	 in	 a	 non-EU	 country	—	 eg.	 the	 USA	—	 the	 award	 should	 only	 be	
refused	enforcement	on	the	grounds	allowed	in	Article	V	of	the	New	York	
Convention.		Public	policy	may	only	be	invoked	against	enforcement	of	the		
final	 award	 for	 ‘flagrant’	 non-compliance	 with	 either	 substantive	 EU	










class	 litigation.	 	 If	 the	 proceedings	 are	 properly	 conducted,	 a	 ‘class’	 award	—	
wherever	made	—	should	be	recognized	and	enforced	throughout	the	EU.	
	
A	 collective	 award	 of	 course	 only	 binds	 those	members	 of	 the	 class	who	 have	







provide	 an	 avenue	 for	 a	 collective	 award	—	 reached	 through	 a	 representative	
procedure	—	to	be	extended	by	court	order	even	to	group	members	who	have	not	

































the	 harmed	 group	 (or	 its	 representative)	 can	 agree	 an	 outcome	 with	 the	
defendant(s)	to	remedy	the	effects	of	the	mass	harm	event	(here,	the	competition	




However,	 the	 availability	 of	 (national	 law)	 collective	 settlement	 mechanisms	
—	extending	the	binding	effect	of	the	settlement	agreement	to	‘non-active’	group	















contentious	 factual	 issues	 on	 liability	 will	 have	 been	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 public	
enforcement	 decisions	—	leaving	 dispute	 over	 amount	 of	 compensation	—	are	
likely	to	fall	within	this	category.	
This	 chapter	 considers	 the	 possibility	 of	 combining	 collective	 competition	
arbitration	—	with	its	advantages	of	scope	and	flexibility	over	litigation	—	with	




collective	 settlement	 order	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 collective	 award.	 This	 hybrid	
























on	 all	 members	 of	 the	 settlement	 class	 described	 in	 the	 application	 by	 the	












claims	 not	 already	 commenced	 in	 litigation.	 	 	 The	 2015	 inclusion	 in	 the	





In	 this	 chapter	 we	 first	 consider	 whether	 collective	 competition	 arbitration	 is	
‘consensual	dispute	resolution’	for	EU	law	purposes.		We	conclude	that	it	can	be.	
In	 the	 light	 of	 this	 conclusion,	 we	 address	 the	 interface	 between	 collective	
settlement	approval	and	the	New	York	Convention.		We	conclude	that	a	collective	
settlement	order	can	extend	the	scope	of	an	award	to	non-consenting	parties	in	











National	 legislation	 in	 the	 EU	 on	 collective	 settlements	—	when	 being	 used	 to	
resolve	disputes	over	directly	effective	EU	law	rights	such	as	competition	law		—	
must	be	interpreted	and	applied	in	the	light	of	EU	law	general	principles	and	the	
‘acquis	 communautaire’. 7 	Both	 of	 the	 main	 EU	 law	 instruments	 relevant	 to	
collective	competition	redress	recommend	or	require	Member	States	to	facilitate	
non-court	settlements.8		 	However,	 the	 language	they	each	use	 to	do	this	varies	
slightly.	 The	 ‘damages’	 Directive	 explicitly	 indicates	 that	 ‘consensual	 dispute	

















for	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 a	 competition	 law	 infringement	 through	 consensual	
dispute	resolution	mechanisms,	such	as	out-of-court	settlements	(including	those	
where	 a	 judge	 can	 declare	 a	 settlement	 binding),	 arbitration,	 mediation	 or	
conciliation.11		
The	 Recommendation	 (perhaps	 unhelpfully)	 uses	 different	 terminology	 and	
recommends	 that	 Member	 States	 “ensure	 that	 judicial	 collective	 redress	
mechanisms	 are	 accompanied	 by	 appropriate	 means	 of	 collective	 alternative	
dispute	resolution”	—	both	before	any	litigation	takes	place	and	during	it.12		The	
Recommendation	 emphasises	 that	 this	 should	 depend	 on	 the	 consent	 of	 the	
parties	involved	in	the	case.13	
Is	there	any	significance	in	this	difference	in	language?		We	do	not	believe	so.		In	
particular,	 both	 phrases	 appear	 capable	 of	 including	 arbitration,	 although	 —	
unlike	the	Directive	—	the	Recommendation	is	not	explicit	on	this	point.	However,	
















European	 Commission	 are	 developing	 a	 variety	 of	 collective	 settlement	















representative	 of	 a	 group	 of	 victims	 to	 apply	 to	 the	 competent	 court	 for	 a	











it	 is	 to	 be	 recognised	 and	 enforceable	 as	 an	 award	 under	 the	 New	 York	
Convention:	






The	 absence	 of	 one	 of	 these	 elements	 may	 either	 invalidate	 the	 proceeding	
entirely	 or	 transform	 it	 into	 another	 type	 of	 alternative	 dispute	 resolution	
procedure.		However,	the	exact	contours	of	the	type	of	proceeding	which	can	be	




An	 arbitration	 proceeding	 leading	 to	 an	 award	 has	 been	 said	 to	 have	 four	
necessary	elements:19	
• consent	to	resolve	disputes	under	the	agreement	to	arbitrate;	













These	 ‘definitions’	 of	 ‘award’	 and	 ‘arbitration’	 clearly	 do	 not	 have	 precise	
boundaries	 —	a	 flexibility	 which	 we	 believe	 assists	 in	 using	 arbitration	 as	 a	




provisions	 allowing	 the	 Competition	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 or	 the	 Competition	 and	
Markets	 Authority	 to	 approve	 non-court	 resolutions	 of	 collective	 competition	
disputes.		These	were	enacted	before	the	implementation	of	Directive	2014/104	
into	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 UK,	 and	 the	 UK	 implementing	 legislation	 to	 the	 Directive	
repeats	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘consensual	 dispute	 resolution’	 given	 in	 the	 Directive	
without	reference	to	the	term	‘settlement’.20	
	










following	a	 court	hearing.	 	 	But	 is	 the	 term	 ‘settlement’	 fully	 coterminous	with	









is,	 it	 is	 an	 A-P-A-R	 mechanism	 (where	 A	 is	 agreement,	 P	 is	 process	 and	 R	 is	
resolution).	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	 majority	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 will	 be	 reached	
through	an	A-P-R	process.	There	must	be	an	 initial	agreement	 to	arbitrate,	but	
there	 is	 no	 necessity	 for	 a	 second	 agreement	 between	 the	 parties	 before	 a	
resolution	of	the	dispute	is	reached.	
	
This	 conclusion	 that	 ‘settlement’	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 same	 as	 ‘consensual	








To	 encourage	 consensual	 settlements,	 an	 infringer	 that	 pays	damages	 through	
consensual	dispute	resolution	should	not	be	placed	in	a	worse	position	vis-à-vis	
its	co-infringers	than	it	would	otherwise	be	without	the	consensual	settlement.	
That	 might	 happen	 if	 a	 settling	 infringer,	 even	 after	 a	 consensual	 settlement,	
continued	 to	 be	 fully	 jointly	 and	 severally	 liable	 for	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 the	
infringement.	[…]22	
	
This	 drafting	 of	 the	 recital	 implies	 that	 any	 outcome	 of	 ‘consensual	 dispute	















The	 Member	 States	 should	 [therefore]	 ensure	 that	 judicial	 collective	 redress	





The	 Recommendation	 thus	 confirms	 that	 all	 forms	 of	 ‘collective	 alternative	
dispute	resolution’	should	depend	on	the	consent	of	the	parties	‘involved	in	the	
case’	—	we	suggest	 indirectly	 as	well	 as	directly	—	and	are	 settlements.	But	 it	
appears	(particularly	from	the	paragraph	title)	to	suggest	that	collective	ADR	and	
(collective)	settlements	are	terms	with	a	difference	in	meaning	—	there	would	be	
no	 need	 to	 reference	 the	 term	 ‘settlement’	 separately	 if	 it	 were	 a	 complete	
synonym	with	ADR.			
	
Nevertheless,	 we	 believe	 that	 this	 ambiguity	 should	 best	 be	 explained	 by	
interpreting	 these	 paragraphs	 so	 that	 that	 the	 encouragement	 to	 settle	
(recommended	 in	 the	 first	 sentence)	 is	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 through	 (collective)	
alternative	 dispute	 resolution	 procedures	 (‘means’).	 	 It	 appears	 that	 ‘collective	
ADR’	describes	the	process	through	which	the	settlement	is	to	be	achieved.	The	
collective	ADR	process	is	to	be	carried	out	only	with	the	agreement	of	the	parties,	











• both	 ‘consensual	 dispute	 resolution’	 and	 ‘collective	 alternative	 dispute	
resolution’	should	be	interpreted	as	having	the	same	scope;	
• that	scope	can	include	arbitration;	
• both	 terms	 describe	 processes	 (‘means’)	 of	 resolving	 a	 dispute	 by	
agreement;	and	




(collective)	 award	—	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 a	 (collective)	 ‘settlement’	 of	 the	
dispute	for	the	purposes	of	both	the	Directive	and	the	Recommendation.			
	















We	 therefore	believe	 that	 the	outcomes	of	 arbitrations	 (ie.	 the	 awards)	 can	be	
used	as	settlements	in	some	—	but	not	all	—	cases.	We	turn	to	consider	the	three	






in	 the	agreement	to	arbitrate,	 the	 intention	of	 the	parties	 to	 ‘settle’	 the	dispute	
using	arbitration	will	depend	to	a	substantial	extent	on	the	terms	of	their	consent.	
	















Chamber	 and	 in	 the	 Australian	 (ACICA)	 model	 clauses.	 It	 should	 therefore	 be	
easier	 for	 a	 court,	 asked	 to	 approve	 a	 ‘settlement’	 resulting	 from	 an	 (English	
language)	 arbitration	 proceeding,	 to	 do	 so	where	 the	 (pre-dispute)	 arbitration	
agreement	is	in	(for	example)	ICC	standard	terms	than	in	LCIA	terms.	
	
Importantly,	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 —	 the	 main	 international	 instrument	





















It	 is	 therefore	 not	 fully	 clear	 whether	 international	 arbitration	 instruments	
unambiguously	accept	that	all	arbitration	awards	can	be	settlements.		And	in	many	
















must,	 we	 believe,	 follow	 that	—	 if	 the	 parties	 have	 consented	 to	 ‘settle’	 their	
dispute	by	arbitration	under	a	clause	expressly	providing	for	this	—	an	arbitration	




before	 he	 makes	 his	 final	 determination	 (so	 an	 A-P-A-R	 procedure)	 and	 it	 is	
recorded	as	an	award,	that	award	too	will	be	a	settlement.	
	
And	 where	 the	 parties	 submit	 an	 existing	 dispute	 to	 arbitration,	 it	 should	 be	





From	 this	 overview,	 it	 is	 doubtful	 whether	 international	 arbitration	 law	 or	
practice	 permits	 all	 awards	 which	 are	 made	 (without	 a	 further	 post–
commencement	agreement)	to	be	considered	 ‘settlements’.	 	A	closer	 inspection	
not	 only	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 but	 also	 the	 procedure	 followed	 by	 the	







‘settlement’	—	may	 have	 an	 impact	 on	whether	 that	 outcome	 can	 properly	 be	
treated	as	a	‘settlement’	for	national	law	purposes.	
	
There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 two	main	 concerns:	 first,	whether	 the	 process	 has	 been	
properly	adapted	 to	a	 ‘collective	redress’	 setting	and,	second,	 in	relation	 to	 the	
extent	of	any	court	intervention	in	the	arbitration	process.	
	




under	a	power	of	 attorney	or	 similar	mandate	—	as	 in	 the	Abaclat	 case	—	 the	
question	of	whether	the	group	members’	consent	has	been	adequately	sought	is	
one	 going	 immediately	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	 jurisdiction. 32 	A	 court	 approving	 a	
collective	 settlement	 application	 will	 need	 to	 be	 satisfied	 that	 ‘non-assigning’	























powers	 to	 resolve	 a	 dispute	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 inaction	 or	 procedural	
disagreement	 of	 the	 parties.	 	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 parties	 cannot	 agree	 on	 the	
appointment	of	the	arbitrator,	national	law	may	permit	a	party	to	the	arbitration	









Under	UK	rules,	we	have	seen	that	a	 ‘settlement’	 requires	 the	acceptance	of	an	
offer	(ie.	consent)	which	leads	to	the	resolution	of	all	or	part	of	a	dispute.		If	the	
court	intervention	is	simply	to	confirm	the	decision	of	the	arbitrator,	we	do	not	




facts	 in	 the	Bazzle	 case	 in	 the	 US,	where	 the	 district	 court	 certified	 a	 ‘class	 in	
arbitration’,	the	procedure	leading	to	the	use	of	the	‘class’	(collective)	procedure	
















Whether	an	award	can	be	a	 ‘settlement’	 for	 the	purposes	of	national	 collective	







arbitration	—	with	 the	 claims	 against	 the	 cartel	 being	 arbitrated	 in	 Frankfurt	
using	CDC	as	the	representative	claimant	—		the	application	for	approval	on	an	
‘opt-out’	basis	of	 a	 ‘collective	 settlement’	 (using	 the	arbitration	award	made	 in	
Germany)	might	 currently	be	brought	either	 in	Amsterdam	or	 in	London.	 	The	
application	would	seek	to	bind	all	members	of	the	class	defined	in	the	award	and	
resident	 in	 the	UK	or	 the	Netherlands	 to	 the	 ‘settlement’,	whether	 or	 not	 they	
consented	to	arbitration	of	their	cartel	dispute	with	CDC.	
	
	In	 the	 Netherlands,	 the	 application	 will	 need	 to	 be	 made	 by	 a	 ‘stichting’	
(representing	the	claimant	group)	and	by	the	defendants,	acting	jointly.		Similarly,	
the	 application	 to	 the	 Competition	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 in	 London	will	 need	 to	 be	
made	jointly	by	the	representative	—	fulfilling	the	UK	legislative	requirements	to	
be	a	representative	claimant	—	and	the	settling	defendants.	37	Thus	—	under	both	






where	 the	 process	 used	 to	 reach	 it	 is	 ‘A-P-R’	 	—	 further	 joint	 consent	 to	 the	
collective	settlement	application	will	be	needed	to	fulfill	these	national	procedural	
requirements.	The	overall	process	would	then	become	‘A-P-R-A’.		In	order	to	avoid	










group	members	who	have	adhered	 (opted-in)	 to	 the	arbitration	—	 it	has	been	
dealt	with	by	the	collective	award.		But	that	resolution	of	the	dispute	only	applies	






bound	 by	 the	 award.	 	 The	 application	 therefore	 puts	 forward	 a	 proposed	
settlement	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 award	 as	 between	 them	 and	 the	 applicant	
defendant(s).	 The	 (same)	 terms	of	 the	 award	will	 (assuming	 the	 application	 is	
approved	unaltered)	then	bind	all	class	members	in	the	jurisdiction.	
	
The	 distinction,	 between	 enforcement	 using	 national	 arbitration	 legislation	 for	
consenting	group	members	and	enforcement	using	collective	settlement	laws	for	
others,	may	nevertheless	be	relevant	if	a	defendant	needs	to	use	the	outcome	of	
the	 proceedings	 to	 bar	 any	 later	 claims	 by	 some	 of	 the	 group	 members.	
Enforcement	of	the	award	(as	against	consenting	group	members)	will	need	to	use	
the	 arbitration	 legislation	 of	 the	 court	 seised,	 but	 should	 be	 relatively	
straightforward	 in	EU	states.	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	 settlement	order	will	need	 to	be	
enforced	using	the	general	provisions	of	private	international	law	—	in	the	EU,	set	
out	 in	 the	 Brussels	 I	 Regulation. 38 		 Extraterritorial	 enforcement	 of	 collective	
settlement	 orders	 is	 a	 novel	 proceeding	 and	 has	 been	 controversial.39		Where	
possible,	a	well-advised	defendant	should	(currently)	rely	on	the	widely	accepted	
principles	of	the	New	York	Convention	and	national	laws	made	to	reflect	it,	rather	




have	noted	 that	 the	 ‘damages’	Directive	 and	 the	Commission	Recommendation	
encourage	Member	 States	 to	 prompt	 parties	 to	 a	 collective	 dispute	 to	 settle	 it	
‘consensually	or	out-of-court’,	including	by	arbitration.		Both	the	Directive	and	the	
Recommendation	 of	 course	 form	 part	 of	 the	 ‘acquis	 communautaire’.	 	 Where	
national	 legislation	 (including	 on	 arbitration)	 is	 ambiguous	 or	 incomplete,	
Member	 State	 courts	 are	 required	 to	 interpret	 the	 legislation	 so	 that	 their	
judgments	give	effect	 as	 far	 as	possible	 to	 the	purpose	of	 relevant	parts	of	 the	
acquis.40		As	we	noted	above,	the	term	‘collective	settlement’	is	not	defined	in	the	
relevant	 UK	 legislation.	 Similarly	 the	 Dutch	 legislation	 simply	 speaks	 of	 an	
‘agreement’	 between	 the	 parties	 making	 the	 application	 for	 approval,	 without	
defining	how	that	agreement	is	to	be	reached.41		This	will	mean	that,	in	borderline	
cases,	where	 the	 court	 is	 unclear	whether	 an	 award	might	 be	 a	 ‘settlement’,	 it	


















the	New	York	 Convention	 and	 by	 the	 preferred	wording	 of	 arbitration	 clauses	
from	some	leading	international	arbitration	institutions	—	for	example,	the	ICC.		









are	 also	 (implicitly)	 envisaged.	 	 National	 collective	 settlement	 legislation	—	at	
least	when	being	used	to	resolve	disputes	of	directly	effective	EU	law	(including	














will	 depend	 on	 the	 detail	 of	 national	 collective	 settlement	 and	 arbitration	
legislation,	 as	well	 as	 the	wording	of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 evidencing	 the	
intention	of	the	parties,	and	the	procedure	leading	to	the	award.		But	an	arbitrator	
not	 only	 derives	 his	 authority	 from	 the	will	 (consent)	 of	 the	 parties.	 	 National	
legislation	 gives	 an	 arbitrator	 (once	 appointed)	 substantial	 non-consensual	
procedural	 powers	 and	 national	 courts	 may	 intervene	 to	 support	 these.		
Therefore,	 a	 minority	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 which	 are	 not	 made	 under	 an	
agreement	to	‘settle’	a	dispute	by	arbitration,	which	are	not	on	agreed	terms	and	
where	 there	 has	 been	 intervention	 by	 the	 court	 of	 the	 seat	 in	 a	 way	 which	










National	 (UK	 and	 Netherlands)	 court-based	 collective	 settlement	 legislation	 is	
therefore	 available	 to	 approve	 all	 collective	 competition	 arbitration	 awards	 on	










Our	 proposed	 ‘hybrid’	 procedure	 would	 give	 an	 outcome	 binding	 not	 only	 on	
claimant	 group	 members	 having	 consented	 to	 arbitration	 but	 also	 on	 others	
within	the	scope	of	national	(court-based)	settlement	orders.		The	extent	of	this	
additional	 scope	 to	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 will	 be	 important	 for	 parties	 —	









dispute	 resolution	 might	 come	 at	 the	 price	 of	 diluting	 the	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	of	the	underlying	arbitration	award	under	the	New	York	Convention.		








right	 to	use	 an	 award	which	 is	 otherwise	 allowed	under	 the	 laws	of	 a	 country	
where	he	might	wish	to	enforce	it.42		This	 ‘more	favourable	right’	provision	has	
been	 relied	 on	 primarily	 where	 the	 national	 laws	 available	 for	 enforcing	








award	 resolves	 the	 dispute	 referred	 to	 arbitration	 even	 if	 it	 has	 not	 been	
recognised	 by	 a	 court,	 and	 so	 it	 has	 legal	 effects	 (not	 least	 in	 preventing	 the	
















can	 be	 enhanced	 by	 court	 approval	 under	 one	 of	 the	 competition	 settlement	
regimes	available	in	EU	Member	States.	 	But	can	such	approval	adversely	affect	
the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 underlying	 collective	 award	 under	 the	
New	York	Convention?	
	
The	 ‘hybrid’	 procedure	 we	 are	 proposing	 in	 this	 Chapter	 requires	 the	 award	
resulting	from	a	collective	competition	arbitration	to	be	used	as	the	basis	for	an	
(agreed)	 application	 for	 approval	 as	 a	 ‘collective	 settlement’	 under	 national	
legislation.		That	is,	the	award	exists	before	the	approval	order	is	made	and	is	thus	
independent	of	 it.45		 In	principle,	 therefore,	 it	 should	continue	 to	bind	all	 those	




collective	award	might	usefully	be	 first	recognised	 in	the	country	of	 the	seat	of	
arbitration	if	it	is	to	be	used	in	this	way.	47		Nevertheless,	a	potential	alternative	
method	of	seeking	recognition	of	the	collective	resolution	of	the	dispute	in	the	seat	


























court	 outside	 the	 country	 of	 arbitration	 to	 refuse	 to	 recognize	 an	 award	 if	 the	
award	has	been	set	aside	or	suspended	by	a	‘competent	authority’	of	the	country	
in	which	it	was	made.			In	both	the	Netherlands	and	the	UK,	the	court	competent	
to	 hear	 arbitration	 enforcement	 claims	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 court	 which	 is	
competent	to	approve	a	collective	settlement.		It	appears	generally	accepted	that	









several	 courts.50		 It	 must	 necessarily	 follow	 that	 any	 court	 order	 approving	 a	





grant	 (or	 refusal)	 of	 approval	 of	 the	 award	 in	 collective	 settlement	 court	
proceedings.		Of	course,	it	is	quite	possible	that	a	defendant,	determined	to	resist	





In	 practice,	 however,	 the	 scope	 for	 a	 defendant	 in	 this	 position	 to	 resist	
international	enforcement	of	the	award	will	be	limited.		The	grounds	for	refusing	
to	 recognize	an	award	 in	Article	V	of	 the	New	York	Convention	are	exhaustive	
—	an	enforcing	court	may	not	rely	on	other	grounds	to	refuse	recognition.51		We	
have	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	the	(non)	applicability	of	the	arbitrability	and	public	
policy	 exceptions	 in	 Article	 V(2)	 of	 the	 Convention	 in	 the	 context	 of	 collective	




















whether	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 developed	 collective	 settlement	 regime	 should	



















national	 collective	 settlement	 regimes	 in	 the	 EU	 —	 that	 a	 national	 collective	
settlement	 application	 can	 be	made	while	 retaining	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 collective	
award	elsewhere.	 	Although	the	parties	may	wish	 to	seat	 the	arbitration	 in	 the	
territory	of	the	court	or	tribunal	to	which	the	collective	settlement	application	is	
likely	 to	 be	made,	 this	may	not	 be	desirable	 or	 indeed	possible	 in	 all	 cases.	 In	
particular,	 if	 a	 single	 law	 is	 to	 be	 the	 law	 governing	 the	 (non-contractual)	
substance,	the	law	of	the	arbitration	agreement	and	the	lex	arbitri	—	to	simplify	
procedural	decision	making	—	 the	 limitations	 resulting	 from	 the	 choice	of	 law	
rules	 for	 non-contractual	 competition	 	 cases	 (which	 apply	 also	 to	 the	 ‘quasi	






the	choice	of	 the	parties	(express	or	 implied).	 If	 the	parties	agree	on	a	place	of	
arbitration	 —	whether	 in	 the	 original	 arbitration	 clause	 or	 subsequently	 (for	
example	in	an	agreement	to	submit	an	existing	dispute	to	arbitration)	—	then	that	
will	be	 the	seat	of	arbitration.54		Clearly,	 it	 is	easier	 to	optimize	 the	arbitration	





















than	 the	 choice	 of	 arbitral	 seat.	 	 For	 this	 reason	 alone,	 care	will	 be	 needed	 to	




collective	 settlement	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 being	 brought	 individually	 before	 the	
Competition	 Appeal	 Tribunal.	 	 The	 principal	 jurisdiction	 criteria	 for	 non-
contractual	competition	claims	are	—	as	we	have	seen	—	either	that	a	defendant	
is	 domiciled	 in	 the	UK	 or	 that	 the	 infringement	 caused	 harm	 in	 the	UK.57		 For	
competition	claims	to	which	neither	of	these	criteria	apply,	the	CAT	has	no	power	
to	make	a	collective	settlement	order.		Even	where	it	has	jurisdiction,	the	CAT	will	
only	make	 a	 collective	 settlement	 order	 if	 the	 collective	 dispute	 appears	 to	 be	














































collective	 settlement	 mechanism	 —	 will	 be	 engaged	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	
competition	 infringement	 had	 an	 effect	 in	 their	 countries. 65 	This	 is	
uncontroversial	if	the	binding	(opt-out)	effect	of	the	collective	settlement	order	is	
limited	to	claimants	in	the	approving	court’s	territory.		However,	the	extension	of	
a	 collective	 settlement	 on	 a	 binding	 basis	 to	 group	 members	 who	 are	 both	
domiciled	elsewhere	and	who	did	not	take	any	steps	in	the	collective	proceedings	












But	 it	 is	 not	essential	 that	 the	 collective	 arbitration	be	 seated	 in	 the	UK	or	 the	
Netherlands:	 the	 collective	 award	 can	 still	 be	used	as	 the	basis	 for	 a	 collective	
settlement	 application	 there.	 	 The	 application	 for	 approval	 will	 need	 to	





















wish	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 collective	 settlement	 order	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 or	 the	 UK.		
Despite	the	immediate	legal	effect	of	the	collective	arbitration	award	given	by	the	
arbitrator	 in	 Germany,	 they	 may	 nevertheless	 also	 wish	 to	 have	 the	 award	
recognized	 by	 the	 German	 court	 before	 making	 the	 collective	 settlement	







• one	 of	 the	 defendants	 has	 concerns	 about	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 collective	
jurisdiction	of	the	arbitrators	as	found	in	the	award	;	
• a	 party	 is	 dissatisfied	 with	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	 collective	 arbitration	
procedure;	or	
• a	 non-active	 group	member	 disputes	 the	 (hypothetical)	 scope	 of	 CDC’s	
power	 to	 represent	 him	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 assignment	 (or	 other	
mandate),	and	thus	disputes	the	arbitrator’s	jurisdiction.	
	
Although	 the	 recognition	 judgment	of	 the	German	court	handed	down	 in	 these	
circumstances	is	neither	required	under	the	New	York	Convention,	nor	binding	on	
other	courts	under	the	Brussels	I	Regulation,67	it	should	have	a	highly	persuasive	
effect	 on	 subsequent	 courts	 —	including	 those	 asked	 to	 approve	 a	 collective	
settlement	application.	
	




by	the	Amsterdam	Court	of	Appeal.	 	 In	contrast,	national	arbitration	 legislation	
normally	confers	any	power	to	supervise	an	arbitration	on	the	civil	court	for	the	
place	where	the	arbitration	has	its	seat	—	the	High	Court	or	a	county	court	in	the	















hearing)	 in	 addition	 to	 that	 already	 undertaken	 in	 the	 arbitration.	 	 For	
example,	the	approving	court	may	need	to	order	notice	to	the	settlement	
class	as	a	whole	(if	this	has	not	already	been	done)	—	not	just	to	those	who	
have	 participated	 in	 the	 arbitration	 —	 and	 may	 also	 request	 further	

































that	 an	 appellate	 court	will	 necessarily	 find	persuasive	 the	 findings	 of	 a	 lower	
court	 over	 which	 it	 exercises	 jurisdiction.	 	 However,	 on	 the	 facts	 of	 our	









discrete	 nature	 of	 national	 collective	 settlement	 proceedings	may	mean	 that	 a	









need	 to	 be	 repeated	 to	 satisfy	 different	 courts	 if	 several	 collective	 settlement	
applications	need	to	be	made.	
	
The	 parties	 will	 therefore	 need	 to	 reach	 a	 ‘cost-benefit’	 view	 on	 where	
applications	 for	collective	settlement	should	be	made.	 	Although	at	present	 the	
number	 of	 viable	 ‘opt-out’	 settlement	 approval	 options	 is	 limited,	 the	 impetus	
given	by	the	European	Commission’s	collective	redress	Recommendation	can	be	






























Although	 the	 requirement	 for	 a	 national	 enforcing	 court	 in	 the	 EU	 to	 consider	
whether	EU	competition	rules	have	been	complied	with	—	in	accordance	with	the	






in	 the	 same	way	as	awards	made	 in	 the	EU.74		Nevertheless,	where	 the	parties	
intend	to	‘convert’	a	non-EU	collective	or	class	award	into	a	collective	settlement	









a	 settlement	 may	 be	 preferable	 to	 the	 more	 ‘traditional’	 route	 of	 seeking	
recognition	 of	 the	 award	 under	 relevant	 national	 arbitration	 legislation	 as	 the	
scope	for	objections	by	class	members	to	the	award	may	be	reduced.	This	will	be	

















they	opt-out),	giving	wider	coverage	—	and	 therefore	greater	 finality	—	to	 the	
resolution	of	the	dispute.		This	was	the	preferred	route	used	in	the	Converium	case,	
where	the	application	to	the	Amsterdam	court	for	a	collective	settlement	order	













The	 principal	 advantage	 is	 that	 the	 resulting	 collective	 award	 should	 be	
enforceable	in	EU	Member	States	under	their	arbitration	legislation	even	if	opt-
out	collective	settlement	approval	is	not	available.		This	is	not	the	case	with	(for	
example)	 US	 class	 action	 judgments,	 which	 are	 generally	 not	 recognized	 in	
European	countries.77		The	other	advantages	are	those	of	arbitration	generally,	in	
particular	 the	ability	 for	 the	parties	 (the	representative	and	 the	defendants)	 to	
select	an	arbitration	tribunal	with	appropriate	expertise	in	the	subject	matter	of	
the	 dispute	—	 likely	 to	 be	 particularly	 attractive	 for	 competition	 law	 disputes	
which	 are	 often	 complex	 and	 where	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 infringement	 may	 vary	
significantly	 from	 sector	 to	 sector.	 The	 near	 total	 global	 recognition	 and	
enforceability	 of	 arbitration	 awards,	 under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention,	 should	





the	 settlement	 is	made,	 the	 advantages	 in	 economy	 of	 process	 and	 use	 of	 the	
expertise	 of	 the	 arbitration	 panel	 in	 evaluating	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	 consensual	
outcome	to	the	competition	dispute	should	be	obvious.		This	is	particularly	likely	
to	 be	 true	 where	 the	 approving	 court	 has	 no	 particular	 expertise	 in	 the	
competition	law	subject	matter	of	the	dispute	and	might	otherwise	have	to	hear	















disputes	 involving	 directly	 effective	 EU	 law.	 	 This	 includes	 resolving	
disputes	through	(collective)	arbitration;	
2. ‘Consensual	 dispute	 resolution’	 describes	 a	 process	 through	 which	 a	
resolution	is	reached	—	here	the	arbitration	proceedings.	 	The	successful	





settlement’.	 	An	arbitration	award	 is	 thus	capable	of	being	a	 ‘consensual	
settlement’;	
3. Many	 (but	 not	 all)	 arbitration	 awards	 will	 be	 ‘consensual	 settlements’.		
Where	the	award	is	made	on	agreed	terms	or	where	it	is	made	under	an	





of	 a	 ‘collective	 settlement’.	 	 The	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 ‘collective	
settlement’	in	relevant	national	legislation	should	be	read	as	far	a	possible	
to	conform	with	the	EU	scope	of	collective	‘consensual	dispute	resolution’;	
5. A	 court	 order	 approving	 a	 collective	 settlement	will	 bind	 those	persons	
within	the	scope	of	the	settlement	order	who	have	not	opted-out	of	it	and	
who	are	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	approving	court;	




a	 single	 settlement	 approval	 order	will	 be	 able	 to	 bind	 all	 potential	 EU	
claimants	 in	most	 cases	where	 use	 of	 this	 ‘hybrid’	 procedure	would	 be	
useful;	
7. Nevertheless,	the	court	approval	of	the	fairness	of	a	settlement	—	based	on	
a	 collective	arbitration	award	—	 is	 likely	 to	have	substantial	persuasive	
effect	 for	other	courts	 in	 the	EU.	 	Where	a	 subsequent	court	 is	asked	 to	
enforce	the	arbitration	award,	 the	settlement	approval	will	 indicate	 that	
the	 arbitration	 procedure	 and	 outcome	 was	 considered	 just	 and	
reasonable	by	another	court.78		The	approval	is	also	likely	to	be	persuasive	
for	 foreign	 courts	 requested	 to	 approve	 a	 collective	 settlement	 in	
equivalent	terms	under	their	own	collective	settlement	regimes	(as	they	
become	more	frequent);	
8. Although	 not	 necessary	 for	 the	 successful	 use	 of	 our	 proposed	 ‘hybrid’	




arbitration	 legislation	 in	 those	 EU	 countries	 which	 (as	 yet)	 have	 no	
collective	 settlement	 regime.	 	 The	 New	 York	 Convention	 preserves	 the	
right	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 arbitration	 to	 use	 the	 award	 under	 ‘more	
favourable’	national	legislation	if	available;	
10. Arbitration	awards	made	outside	the	EU	can	also	be	used	as	the	basis	for	a	





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wexler	v	AT&T	Corporation	15-CV-0686 (FB) (PK) 
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